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The Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Reform Task Force (“Task Force”) was convened 
by the Greater Oklahoma City Chamber of  Commerce in response to a crisis of  jail 
overcrowding conditions at the Oklahoma County Jail and an ongoing investigation by the 
U.S. Department of  Justice. 
Chaired by Clay Bennett, the Task Force included members of  the business community, 
Oklahoma City and County officials, state officials, and law enforcement stakeholders. The 
purpose of  the Task Force is to collaborate on a civic improvement urgently needed in 
Oklahoma County: a local justice system that reflects our values of  fairness, compassion 
and good governance; a system of  pretrial detention that effectively prioritizes public safety 
through data-informed and evidence-based practices; and a jail that is a safe and humane 
place for both staff  and inmates. 
Our mission is to independently assess our community’s criminal justice system by 
analyzing the processes that lead to jail population, understanding how the decisions 
are made, identifying the costs associated with these decisions, recommending priorities 
to responsibly reduce jail population, and outlining long-term sustainability options. To 
effectively conduct this assessment, the task force received policy and research analysis 
from the Vera Institute of  Justice (“Vera”), a renowned independent nonprofit national 
research and policy organization.
The current situation does not befit our vision for a great city. The jail is our county’s most 
restrictive and most expensive public safety resource and we think it is imperative that we 
examine whether we are using that resource wisely and justly. We believe that jail is not a 
humane or effective response to pressing public health issues such as mental illness and 
substance abuse. When citizens suffering from mental illness or substance abuse do end up 
in jail, there are not enough treatment resources to reach all in need; and that by overusing 
our jail, particularly for this population, we divert resources away from people who could be 
safely and compassionately managed in our communities. Public safety is an utmost priority. 
The attached report contains Vera’s recommendations for establishing stewardship over the 
system; keeping people who are not a public safety threat out of  jail; improving processes 
for determining who can be safely released to the community while awaiting trial; hastening 
the time to process a case a case in court; and reducing unnecessary jail admissions due to 
criminal justice debt. 
The task force intends to lead our community’s implementation of  these proposed 
strategies and we believe they represent the beginning of  a new era in Oklahoma County’s 
criminal justice system -- one that reflects our values of  justice, fairness, equity, good 
governance and civic pride. 
Timothy R. Henderson
Presiding District Judge
Oklahoma & Canadian Counties
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Introduction 
 
Jails in the United States have experienced dramatic growth over the past 30 years. Between 1983 and 
2013, annual jail admissions nearly doubled, from 6 million to 11.7 million.1 There are more than 3,000 
jails in the United States, holding 731,000 people on any given day. While bi-partisan national attention 
has focused on the cost of growing state prisons, and the need to reduce prison populations, many more 
people pass through local correctional facilities. The growing cost of those facilities, and the responsibility 
of managing them, falls to county and local governments.   
Oklahoma County has followed national trends in explosive jail growth. Since 1983, the county jail 
population in Oklahoma County has grown from 495 people to 2,581, a more than fivefold increase.2 The 
incarceration rate, the number of people incarcerated in the jail per 100,000 in the population, has nearly 
tripled, from 119 to 432.3 Oklahoma County has the highest jail incarceration rate of the five large counties 
in the state, and the highest jail incarceration rate of any county of similar size in Oklahoma or the states 
that surround it.        
In 1991, when the jail population was 754 people and the incarceration rate was 190, the county 
opened a new, larger jail facility. Its design and functioning have been widely criticized almost from the 
day it opened. Conditions and overcrowding at the jail have now reached crisis proportions. Originally 
built to house up to 1,200 people, the jail now averages more than twice that many. In 2016, there have 
been 11 deaths in custody—five by suicide, others due to medical conditions—more than 2014 and 2015 
combined.4 In 2003, the Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation of unlawful conditions at 
the jail. On July 31, 2008, the DOJ issued its findings. It identified four areas in which the jail’s 
insufficiencies amounted to a violation of the constitutional rights of the people incarcerated there: failure 
to provide 1) reasonable protection from harm; 2) constitutionally-required mental health care services; 
3) adequate housing, sanitation, and environmental protections; and 4) protection from serious fire-safety 
risks. The county and the DOJ entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2009 citing 60 
issues for repair by 2014. The county completed 56 of them as of the 2014 deadline and has received an 
extension on the remaining four.  
In 2015, with concerns about the jail mounting and new discussions starting about whether to replace 
it, at significant cost to the county, the Greater Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce (“the Chamber”) 
convened the Greater Oklahoma City Chamber Criminal Justice Task Force (“the Task Force”). There 
have been a number of initiatives in the past to address the question of what should be done about the jail. 
None, however, questioned why the jail was overcrowded, how it was used, and whether that use actually 
served the county’s public safety needs effectively. But this Task Force, under the leadership of the 
Chamber and Chairman Clay Bennett, has successfully engaged state-, county- and city-level 
policymakers, criminal justice stakeholders, the judiciary, state agencies, and the local business 
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community to take on those questions. Rather than just consider whether to build a new jail and how big a 
new jail should be, the Task Force set out to study the factors influencing the size and characteristics of 
the county’s jail population in order to learn the sources of the population pressures the jail has been 
experiencing and the steps that could be taken to reduce them.   
In February 2016, the Task Force contracted with the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) to assist and 
guide this analysis. Vera is an independent nonprofit organization that has worked over the last five 
decades to transform justice systems through research, policy, practice, and public engagement. Vera has 
worked all over the United States to help counties and local justice systems achieve their jail reduction 
goals.  
Vera reviewed policies and practices, interviewed key stakeholders in Oklahoma City and at the 
county level, and worked with them to create a detailed map of the criminal justice system to understand 
people’s pathways through it to the jail. In addition, Vera researchers analyzed administrative data from 
Oklahoma County and the Oklahoma City Police Department to shed light on the drivers of the jail 
population. Through these analyses, researchers aimed to develop a shared understanding of the local 
justice system among members of the Task Force, as a starting point for consideration and investigation 
of potential reform measures. Despite many limitations to the available data, the Task Force held robust 
discussions about how the justice system should function and what types of changes could be made.  
This report presents the findings and recommendations from Vera’s assessment, and offers guidance 
on how the county can safely reduce its jail population and create a more just and effective local justice 
system. There are four key points that Vera hopes any reader of this report will take away. 
 
First, if nothing is done to address the systemic drivers of jail overcrowding described in this report, any 
new facility, regardless of its size, will experience the same problems as the current facility. The challenges 
that the Oklahoma County jail faces are the result of system failures, not just deficiencies in the physical 
plant. To be sure, there are critical humanitarian concerns with the current facility, but jail overcrowding 
is not a problem that the county can simply build its way out of. Rather, the county needs systemic 
reforms that address the root causes of the overcrowding. The strategies discussed in this report are 
aimed at addressing these systemic problems. 
 
Second, change is possible. Decision makers on the ground in Oklahoma County control many of the 
levers that determine who ends up in jail and they can, collaboratively, make a different set of decisions 
and achieve a different result. Jurisdictions around the country have deliberately sought to reduce their 
jail populations by changing how their jails are used, with the goal of increasing fairness and making 
smarter use of limited public safety dollars. None have seen a growth in crime or disorder as a result. 
Examples are provided throughout this report.   
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Third, no change will happen without dedicated and meaningful collaboration and engagement by 
leaders and staff across the agencies that make up the criminal justice system and with the public. The 
size of a jail (or any correctional facility for that matter) is governed by two factors: who comes into the 
jail (referred to as “admissions”) and how long they stay (referred to as “length of stay”). No one person or 
agency is solely responsible for the policies and practices that drive those two factors: law enforcement, 
prosecutors, judges, county and municipal executives, and other stakeholders all play a role. To 
successfully reduce the overuse of the jail, the county must take a multi-pronged, cross-agency approach 
to reform. The ultimate goal of this process should be to develop a shared vision and create a thoughtful, 
coordinated system. This collaboration has to be institutionalized or any reforms will not be sustainable. 
Moreover, the effort must extend to the residents of Oklahoma County. Lasting change necessitates public 
engagement. Having the public’s support and understanding is critical to ensuring that reforms outlast 
political changes and challenges. 
 
Finally, thinking wisely and efficiently about how and for whom the county uses the jail is not only a 
matter for the bottom line. Eighty percent of people in the jail are being held pretrial. And pretrial 
detention—being put in jail even if one has not (yet) been convicted of a crime and is awaiting disposition 
(through trial or a guilty plea)—should not be the default option for people awaiting trial; it should be 
used only as necessary to prevent flight or address a serious risk to public safety. The conservative use of 
pretrial detention reflects essential constitutional and equitable principles of due process and liberty. 
Furthermore, pretrial detention has adverse public safety effects. Research has found that detaining 
defendants who have been assessed as low-risk of flight or low-risk for committing a serious offense for a 
day or longer while awaiting trial is associated with higher recidivism rates two years after disposition, in 
addition to longer terms of incarceration.5 Just a day or two in jail can result in a lost job, disruption of 
childcare, schooling, and pro-social connections, and can worsen already fragile finances and economic 
stability. Unnecessary pretrial detention exacts human and moral costs, making the work of this Task 
Force even more urgent.  
 
In the report that follows, we first present what Vera learned by analyzing administrative data. We then 
divide up our findings and responsive strategies into six categories: 1) improving governance, oversight, 
and accountability; 2) reducing admissions for municipal violations and low-level offenses; 3) creating a 
fair and efficient pretrial release process; 4) identifying and addressing case processing delays; 5) 
expanding diversion programming, particularly for those with mental health and substance abuse 
treatment needs; and 6) reducing jail admissions related to criminal justice debt. We subsequently 
provide recommendations for legislative changes that will support the recommendations in this report. 
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Finally, we estimate some of the jail population reduction that could be achieved if reforms are 
implemented. 
 
Executive summary of recommendations 
 
After collaborating with the Greater Oklahoma City Chamber Criminal Justice Task Force and the 
Chamber of Commerce, reviewing policies and practices that shape the local criminal justice system and 
analyzing available administrative data, Vera has identified six major areas for reform in the Oklahoma 
County justice system. These will not come as a surprise for those who work in the system or are familiar 
with it. While there are major constraints imposed by state law, tight budgets, and a subsequent lack of 
resources, Vera and the Task Force have developed strategies the county can implement locally, which will 
reduce the jail population and produce a more equitable justice system. Some can be enacted right away, 
some will take more planning, further research, and an investment of resources. These are not the only 
things to be done, but they provide a place to start. 
 
The six areas for reform are summarized below:  
 
1. Provide governance and oversight of the local justice system. The ever-increasing jail 
population has been enabled by the lack of oversight of local policies and practices. The independent 
actors within the local justice system who make these decisions do not share an understanding of how 
the jail, the most restrictive and most costly criminal justice resource in the county, should be used. 
There is no coordination or collaboration across the system, and no one is regularly collecting and 
reviewing the data that would tell them how that system is working. Section 1, on p. 25, contains 
recommendations for governance and data-driven decision making, beginning with the creation of a 
permanent, staffed oversight and policy advisory body that can spearhead and sustain reforms.   
 
2. Keep people charged with lower level offenses out of the jail entirely. Vera estimates that 
80 percent of people coming into the jail are pretrial; they are not being punished for an offense, they 
have not been found guilty. One-quarter of all jail admissions are for the lowest-level offenses: 
municipal and traffic violations—public drunkenness, not having a driver’s license at the time of a 
traffic stop, failing to pay a municipal fine or fee, etc.—from Oklahoma City. Section 2 provides 
strategies designed to reduce jail admissions for these types of offenses. Even though people booked 
into the jail on these charges do not stay long, they account for much of the volume in the booking 
area of the jail, taking up staff time and space and slowing other operations.  
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3. Create an effective, evidence-based process for deciding who stays in jail while their 
case proceeds and who goes home, so that the jail is not filled solely by those who 
cannot afford cash bail. Currently, who stays in the jail pretrial is determined by a bail schedule, 
which sets bail amounts cumulatively by charge, without any individualized consideration of 
circumstances. People who can’t find the money to pay stay in; well-off people get out. Currently, the 
county does not consider the likelihood that someone will appear in court or if that person is an actual 
public-safety risk. As a result, no one in the county justice system can say whether the people are 
there for legitimate legal or safety reasons. Section 3 contains short-term strategies for improving 
current decision making and longer-term options for creating a system that reflects national best 
practices.  
 
4. Improve the processes that move cases through the court system. While almost half of 
those who come into the jail get out within three days by paying bail or getting released on a 
municipal charge, those who do not will linger in the jail as their cases proceed through the court 
system. Delays and systemic inefficiencies make this process protracted, increasing the length of time 
defendants linger in jail. Section 4 includes recommendations on how defendants can be charged 
more quickly, shortening the amount of time it takes to dispose of cases, and reducing failure to 
appear warrants, which bring people back into the jail and the court system.  
 
5. Create alternatives to jail for people with mental illness and/or substance use 
disorders. The data suggest that the jail in Oklahoma County, as in many places, has a high 
prevalence of people with mental illness. In addition, the most common state misdemeanor and 
felony charges for jail inmates were drug and/or alcohol-related, suggesting high rates of addiction. 
Oklahoma County does not have the resources and effective justice system pathways to get people out 
of jail and into treatment so that they don’t keep coming back. Section 5 includes recommendations 
for how to place defendants into specialty courts more quickly, focusing resources on high-utilizers—a 
small but costly subset of people who cycle in and out of jails and hospitals, and expanding options for 
diverting people with special needs out of the jail and into community-based options.  
 
6. Stop putting people who don’t have money in jail for not paying fines, fees, and court 
costs. There are at least 103 fees and fines codified in state statute and 26 in the municipal code. 
Individuals can easily accumulate thousands, if not tens-of-thousands, of dollars’ worth of criminal 
justice debt. Some will likely never be able to pay off these costs in their lifetimes and jail 
incarceration is an expensive and ineffective response to default on these debts. In Section 6, Vera 
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recommends strategies for reducing the arrests of people who have fallen behind on payments, 
improving indigency determinations, and reducing jail bookings for failure-to-pay warrants.  
 
As noted above, the bulk of this report contains recommendations for strategies that can be implemented 
at the local level, but Vera has also suggested legislative priorities that would support the efforts of the 
county to run a better local justice system. Stakeholders should consider pursuing legislation that 1) 
improves pretrial practices across the state and 2) establishes mechanisms to better understand the role 
that fines, fees, and costs have in sustaining (or not sustaining) local criminal justice agencies and 
evaluate the costs to the government of attempting to collect outstanding debts.  
 
 
Administrative data analysis: Oklahoma County’s criminal 
justice system  
 
Vera’s analysis of Oklahoma County data focused on understanding the two components that drive jail 
populations: admissions and length of stay. With data provided by the Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Office 
(OCSO), Vera analyzed all admissions during a one-year period (“2015 admissions cohort”) and a 
“snapshot” of everyone in the jail on a single day (June 1, 2015). These two approaches shed light on how 
people are entering and exiting the jail as well as the makeup of the population on a given day. 
Additionally, researchers reviewed data collected by the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD), 
which is responsible for about 60 percent of all bookings into the county jail. Although this data cannot 
shed light on the other 40 percent of jail admissions brought from other law enforcement agencies in the 
county, the OCPD data provides deeper insight into the charges of those admitted to jail which could not 
be captured in the County’s jail data.  
 
 
Data limitations 
Data available for this assessment was severely limited because of current data collection practices and a 
lack of capacity in the county for data extraction and data sharing. This speaks to the critical need for the 
county to invest in a data system that will enable local officials to perform analyses and assessments of 
system performance. The recommendations on data and governance (page 26) pertain to this issue.   
Although Vera was able to get some sense of the charges leading to admission into the jail, length of 
time spent in jail, and population demographics, there are many aspects of the criminal justice system in 
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Oklahoma County that impact jail population that Vera was unable to analyze. The major areas of 
limitation are detailed below.     
First, it was difficult to get an accurate understanding of who was in the jail pretrial (awaiting 
disposition on a case) versus who was in the jail post-conviction (for a violation of supervision, unpaid 
fines, or serving a jail sentence). Vera approximates that at least 80 percent of jail inmates are in jail 
awaiting trial or plea or a hearing on some open matter, but this is a rough estimate based on who we 
know is not pretrial. The jail data do not allow us to distinguish between those who were admitted for a 
new charge and those admitted for a violation of probation while on a suspended or deferred sentence. It 
was also difficult to distinguish people held in the jail for multiple reasons, such as a new arrest in 
combination with a probation failure or a failure to appear on an old case. Jails in Oklahoma can also hold 
people who receive sentences of less than a year, usually for misdemeanors; the jail data records show no 
one in this category.  It may be the case that no one serves a short sentence in Oklahoma (they either get a 
suspended or deferred sentence with probation or get a sentence of time served), but it is impossible to 
tell.  This knowledge is crucial, particularly given the passage of State Question 780, which will convert 
certain felony offenses to misdemeanors; within current capacity, the county is unable to estimate the 
impact this will have on the jail population.    
Second, as will be described at greater length in this report, Oklahoma County’s pretrial system is 
dependent upon cash bail, but important data for analyzing bail-related outcomes were not available. 
While researchers were able to determine length of time between arrest and bail payment for in-custody 
defendants, data was not available on the amount of bond posted, nor was any information available 
regarding in-custody defendants who were not able to post bail pending their trials, including bail amount 
and length of stay.    
Third, data on why people were released from jail—because they posted bond, served their sentence, 
were transferred to the Department of Corrections (DOC), or released on their own recognizance—was 
limited and sometimes contradictory. For instance, someone in the jail on three charges may have three 
different release reasons: one charge may have been dismissed, one may have resulted in time-served, and 
the third may have resulted in a transfer to the DOC. This made understanding what drove their length of 
stay difficult. Thus, Vera could not draw substantive conclusions from release type data. 
 Finally, case-level data from the district court system was not available from the Oklahoma 
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC). This data set would have allowed Vera to better understand 
how cases get processed in the county, where delays occur, and how these delays impact admissions to the 
jail and length of stay. Vera reviewed a data report on the Oklahoma County District Court from the AOC, 
which shed some light on aggregate case processing times. However, these reports did not distinguish 
case processing times for people who were in jail versus people who were in the community pending trial. 
(See Section 4 for an overview.) 
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In spite of the data limitations, however, Vera was able to review some key data from the OCSO and 
the OCPD. The analyses from these data points, along with findings from Vera’s system analyses and 
policy review, underlie our recommendations. This section provides an overview of key data findings. 
Strategies for improving data collection in order to improve jail practices are included in Section 1 and in 
Appendix A.   
 
Key findings 
I. Who was detained in the jail in 2015? 
 
Key findings from the Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Office 2015 admissions data include: 
 
 Almost 30,000 people entered the county jail in 2015. There were 39,349 total bookings of 
28,326 unique individuals, as some people were booked into the jail more than once in 2015.  
 
 Figure 1 shows that the majority of individuals were booked into the jail only once in 2015. 
But those who were booked more than once in 2015 (one-quarter of all individuals), 
accounted for 45 percent of the bookings (17,824 bookings).  
 
Figure 1.  
Count of people and admissions into the jail 
 
 
People Admissions 
People with one booking 21,525 
(76.0%) 
21,525 
(54.7%) 
People with two 
bookings 
4,497 
(15.9%) 
8,994 
(22.9%) 
People with three or 
more bookings 
2,304 
(8.1%) 
8,830 
(26.1%) 
Total 28,326 
(100%) 
39,349 
(100%) 
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 Oklahoma County’s rate of female incarceration was high compared to the national 
average for a county of its size.6 Twenty-seven percent (more than 10,000) of total admissions 
last year were women. 
 For individuals booked into the jail, the most common booking agency was the OCPD (59.5 
percent), followed by the OCSO (21.4 percent). (The booking agency is the law enforcement 
entity that brings an individual to the county jail.) Collectively, the smaller municipal police 
departments in the county were responsible for about 19 percent of jail bookings. This is in part just a 
function of their smaller size and also because some, like Edmond and Midwest City, have their own 
facilities for people who are charged with municipal violations. See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  
Top five booking agencies in 2015  
N=39,349 bookings 
 
 
 
 
Oklahoma City 
Police Dept
59.5%
Oklahoma 
County Sheriff
21.4%
Troop A
2.5%
Edmond Police 
Dept
2.3%
Midwest City 
Police Dept 
1.9%
Other
12.5%
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Figure 3. 
Jail population by race vs. Oklahoma County population by race 
OK County population by race 
 
 
Jail population by race 
 
 
 
 
II. What charges send people to jail in Oklahoma County? 
 
This section contains three types of data. First, we provide data on what are called “arresting” charges in 
the OCSO data. An arresting charge is the reason a law enforcement agency cites for bringing an 
individual to the jail. While the person might have been originally charged with burglary, for example, the 
reason they were brought to the jail is a failure to pay a fine that was assessed as a result of a conviction 
for that charge, so failure to pay is the arresting charge. This data tells us how the jail is actually being 
used.  
 
Arresting Charges in 2015 
 
 There were almost 60,000 arresting charges associated with the 39,349 jail admissions 
in 2015. Some individuals were booked on more than one charge.  
 
 Municipal charges were the most common arresting charge in 2015. A municipal charge is 
a violation of Oklahoma City’s municipal code. This category includes ordinance violations (known 
Hispanic or 
Latino
16%
White
58%
Black or African 
American
15%
American Indian/Alaskan 
Native 3% Other 
8%
Black
or African 
American
40%
White
44%
Hispanic
or Latino 11%
American/Alaskan Native
4% Other
1%
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locally as Class A charges) that carry a maximum penalty of $500 and city misdemeanor crimes (Class 
B charges) that have a maximum penalty of up to a $1,200 fine and up to 180 days in jail. Figure 4 on 
the following page details the top 10 most frequent arresting charges. 
 
 After municipal charges, many jail admissions were due to non-criminal behavior (see 
Figure 4). The following categories of arresting charges do not indicate that a new crime was the 
reason for jail admission. In some cases, however, they point to system failures: 
o Temporary commitment. There were 2,222 temporary commitments made in 2015; these are 
short periods of incarceration ordered by a judge from the court, not for a new crime, but for 
some sort of violation. For instance, if a defendant has been mandated to secure private counsel 
but appears back in court without a lawyer, perhaps due to financial constraint, a judge can give 
him a temporary commitment in jail for being in “contempt of the court.”   
 
o Failure to appear. These are individuals who have missed one or more court date at any stage of 
the court process; the court then issues a warrant for their arrest. 
 
o Out of custody. Out of custody bookings are people with warrants who come to the jail on their 
own to post bail; they are processed and released immediately. 
 
o Surrender on bond. Surrender on bond takes place when a bail bondsmen “returns” a client back 
to jail; this can take place for any reason, such as failure to renew a bond amount. There were 
1,441 instances of surrender on bond last year.  
 
o Violation of suspended sentence. Violation of suspended sentences often result when an 
individual does not or cannot pay his community supervision (e.g. DA probation) fees.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
16  Vera Institute of Justice 
 
 
Figure 4. 
The 10 most frequent arresting charges for individuals booked into the jail by all 
agencies 
 
 
Next, we look at the underlying charges for those in the Oklahoma County jail. This provides an overview 
of the types of crimes leading to local criminal justice involvement. Figures 5, 6, and 7 capture the 
underlying charge of people who were booked into the jail in 2015. Some people were booked into the jail 
multiple times, which increases these numbers. For example, an individual might have been arrested and 
charged with felony possession of a controlled dangerous substance and misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia. He was released on bond but then failed to appear at a court date, was arrested on a 
warrant, and booked a second time into the jail. In this instance, the arresting charge was failure to 
appear, but the underlying charges were felony possession and misdemeanor paraphernalia. Then, this 
individual was sentenced to Community Sentencing, but violated the terms of his suspended sentence and 
was rearrested after the DA filed an application to accelerate his sentence. Because he was arrested a total 
of three times in 2015 for the underlying charges, Figure 5 would capture the felony possession charge 
three times and Figure 6 would include three charges for possession of paraphernalia.  
 
 
 Drug- and alcohol-related crimes were the most frequent underlying charges of jail inmates.  
o Of the top 10 most frequent underlying felony charges displayed in Figure 5, 63 percent were 
drug/alcohol-related. The majority are non-violent. (Figure 5) 
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o Of the top 10 underlying misdemeanor charges, 69 percent were drug/alcohol-related. With the 
exception of domestic abuse (5 percent of the top 10 charges), the most common misdemeanor 
charges are non-violent. (Figure 6) 
o Twenty-eight percent of the most common underlying municipal charges are alcohol-related. 
(Figure 7) 
 
 Driver’s license and insurance issues (excluding DUI) were very common underlying misdemeanor 
and municipal charges.  
o Twenty percent of the top 10 underlying misdemeanor charges were related to issues with a 
driver’s license and/or insurance (Figure 6), as were 43 percent of the municipal charges  
(Figure 7). 
 
Figure 5. 
The 10 most frequent underlying felony charges for jailed individuals 
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Figure 6. 
The 10 most frequent underlying misdemeanor charges for jailed individuals 
Figure 7 
The 10 most frequent underlying municipal charges for jailed individuals 
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Bookings by the Oklahoma City Police Department 
 
The third type of data is information about charges from the OCPD, which is responsible for about 60 
percent of bookings into the jail. In addition to arresting charges, data from OCPD helps shed light on the 
role of warrants in driving jail admissions.  
 
 The OCPD made 24,942 bookings into the jail involving 18,860 individuals in 2015. 
Although the vast majority of these individuals were booked just once in 2015, almost 4,000 people 
were booked at least one subsequent time. Of note, Vera identified 104 people who were booked into 
the jail by an OCPD officer at least six times last year. 
 
 Of the 24,942 OCPD jail bookings, 57 percent had at least one state charge (a misdemeanor or 
felony in state statute processed in district court). Thirty-six percent of the bookings did not involve a 
charge more serious than a municipal charge, and 7 percent had a traffic violation as their most severe 
charge. 
 
 More than half (58 percent) of all people booked by OCPD had an open warrant at time 
of arrest.  If an officer finds an open arrest warrant, he or she, in most cases, will have to make an 
arrest. 
 
 But of those booked into jail without a warrant, 64 percent faced nothing more serious 
than a municipal charge or traffic violation (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.  
Most serious charge for people booked into jail by OCPD without an open warrant   
 
 
III. How long are people detained in jail?: Length of stay 
 
Data from the 2015 admissions cohort reveals that half of those who entered the jail were 
released within three days. However, due to the number of individuals with longer stays (over 
1,000 people were held five months or longer), the average length of stay was 21 days, which is 
similar to national averages.7 For those who did not get out within this three day window, 
the average length of stay was 41 days. 
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Figure 9. 
Length of stay, 2015 admissions cohort 
N=39,349 
 
 Men stayed in jail longer than women. Men who were admitted to the jail in 2015 stayed an 
average of 23 days; women stayed an average of 15 days. This is likely due to the relative severity of 
the types of charges men and women face.  
 
 People of color stayed in jail longer than white people. White people had an average length of 
stay of 19 days, Native Americans 23 days, and black people 24 days.  
 
 Vera also analyzed how many days each person had been in jail for the snapshot population on June 1. 
Statistically, this analysis captures more of the individuals with longer lengths of stay. On June 1, 
the average length of stay was 184 days. 376 people had been incarcerated for over a 
year. (See Figure 10) 
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Figure 10.  
Length of stay of people in jail on June 1, 2015 
 
 Data on bail set and paid is scant, but Vera’s analysis found that of those who were released on 
bail, 76 percent did so within a week of booking; 17 percent spent more than a week in jail 
before making their bond (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11.  
Time spent in jail from admission to bail payment date 
N=11,324 
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Recommendations 
 
Vera and the Task Force developed the following recommendations by analyzing available data, reviewing 
policies and practices in the justice system in collaboration with Oklahoma County justice system 
stakeholders, and considering opportunities locally and statewide. As noted earlier, the quality of the data 
currently available to the Task Force has limited some of what we can say with confidence about the 
drivers of the jail population. Nonetheless, there are clear patterns in much of the data we have, pointing 
to areas ripe for reform. 
 
 
1. Create oversight and accountability mechanisms for the local justice 
system  
 
Key findings and challenges 
 
1. Oklahoma City and county stakeholders do not have a history of collaboration and do not have 
mechanisms in place to jointly manage the local justice system and the jail population.  
 
2. The county government structure is not set up to provide effective oversight or management of the 
jail population. 
 
3. Criminal justice agencies in Oklahoma City and county have not been collecting, analyzing, or 
sharing the data that would enable them to understand who is in the jail and why or to make data-
informed reforms.   
 In many agencies, the data are collected but are not analyzed or used to inform policy or practice 
decisions. Each agency collects at least some information, but most of it is not reviewed or 
analyzed, in part because they lack the capacity. For example, the sheriff’s office has staff at the 
jail who enter data in a database and use it to manage the population and the county has technical 
experts who keep the database up and running—but there is little-to-no coordination between 
these entities. No one within the county’s information technology agency is familiar enough with 
the justice system or the jail to be able to properly analyze the data or address queries. 
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 In other cases, the data are not being collected at all and the agency lacks the system or staff 
capacity to do so. Even where some data are being collected, key information is still missing. 
Examples include: 
o Bail amounts assessed 
o Appearance rates in the municipal and district courts 
o Reasons for warrants 
o Declination rates by the DA’s office 
o Continuance rates in the district court 
o Diversion offers and acceptances 
 
 Across the board, data are not shared between agencies and are not publicly available. One main 
reason for the lack of data sharing is the absence of a forum for doing so; as noted above, there is 
no collaborative structure for oversight of the jail population. In addition, data systems used by 
respective agencies do not connect with each other: for example, some collect information by 
case, some by charge, and some by booking number.  
 
4. Racial and ethnic data are not collected consistently across agencies, making racial disparities 
difficult to analyze and address.  
 
Responsive strategies 
 
The Task Force has provided something that Oklahoma County has not had before: a collaborative, 
deliberative body, composed of representatives from city, county, and state government and other 
community leaders that focused on understanding and improving the local justice system. Prior 
committees and task forces have studied the jail and addressed whether to build a new one, but none have 
actually looked at what has been driving jail population growth, or the policies and practices that 
determine who goes into the jail and for how long.    
The decisions that influence the jail population are made by multiple, largely autonomous system 
actors such as law enforcement, judges, the district attorney, and the sheriff. No one decision-maker in 
Oklahoma County solely influences the size of the jail population. To understand and address the drivers 
of jail growth successfully, all stakeholders across the criminal justice system will have to work 
cooperatively around the issue of jail use.  
The following strategies are aimed at enabling local oversight of the jail population and sustaining 
reform. 
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Strategy 1a: Establish and staff a planning team to advance implementation of the Task Force 
recommendations. 
Ultimately, Oklahoma County, in collaboration with Oklahoma City and other municipalities within the 
county, should establish a permanent, staffed criminal justice council (see Strategy 1b), but this will take 
time. In the interim, an implementation planning team should be constituted to take on the work of 
advancing the reforms recommended by the Task Force. Membership should include the agencies 
necessary to implement new policies and practices, most of whom have been participating in the Task 
Force, as well as wider representation from community leaders. Each agency or entity should designate 
staff to participate, authorizing them to make at least preliminary decisions if the participant is not the 
agency lead, and commit to sharing data.  
The obligations of each participating member can be established by a memorandum of 
understanding. The team should assign someone to be responsible for convening the group, documenting 
decisions, ensuring follow-up, and maintaining momentum. The group should also establish a timeline for 
its work and develop a shared communication strategy, with a commitment to public transparency and 
accountability. It can create smaller working groups, partner with local universities for data analysis and 
research assistance, and conduct outreach to the wider community.  
 
Strategy 1b: Develop a standing regional criminal justice coordinating body with sufficient staff and 
research capacity. 
Many counties that have implemented lasting local reforms have been guided by standing multi-agency 
councils. Most commonly referred to as criminal justice coordinating councils (CJCCs), these bodies 
monitor local criminal justice operations on a consistent and ongoing basis. Responsibilities range from 
data collection to setting budget priorities to addressing key systemic issues such as slow case processing 
times.  Membership usually includes county and city agencies, which helps to break down silos and 
enhance cooperation, and can also include public members, such as community and business leaders and 
service providers. A CJCC can help a jurisdiction8: 
 
 develop a deeper understanding of problems facing the local justice system; 
 increase cooperation among various criminal justice agencies and other crucial government and non-
governmental agencies; 
 establish clear priorities for the system and support the implementation of those priorities; and 
 gain efficiencies and reduce costs. 
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CJCCs usually do not have executive or fiscal authority, although they can be structured to do so. These 
bodies have, however, provided a mechanism for collaborative problem-solving and establishing mutual 
interests. An Oklahoma County CJCC would likely include many of the same agencies and individuals 
participating in the Task Force and on an implementation planning team but could also integrate non-
criminal justice actors such as representatives from the nonprofit sector and from communities most 
impacted by jail incarceration.  
In order to be effective, a CJCC needs staff to administer the group, collect and analyze data, produce 
reports, apply for grants, and take on other necessary tasks. Thus, although the investment is not 
significant, it is not without cost and it must be sustainable.  
See Appendix B for additional information and resources about establishing a local criminal justice 
coordinating council.  
 
Strategy 1c: Improve data capacity and collection across agencies and share data through the CJCC.  
The local justice system in Oklahoma County is neither data-driven nor data-informed.  This made the 
work of the Task Force more daunting: no one in the system regularly reviews, analyzes, or shares data 
and the data collection practices and systems that exist make answering even the most basic questions 
difficult, undercutting the ability of the Task Force to understand current jail use. While Vera was able to 
identify many potential drivers of jail growth through system-mapping (an intensive day-long exercise 
where all the local criminal justice stakeholders met and mapped all the entry and exit points of the 
system and how cases are processed) and conversations with stakeholders, only a limited number of those 
could be investigated empirically with data.   
While short-staffing and resource constraints can deprioritize data collection, improving these efforts 
will be a crucial component of managing the jail population and relieving overcrowding. Appendix A 
provides a list of data points that the city and county should collect in order to form a baseline 
understanding of local jail usage and trends.   
The CJCC can be the forum through which Oklahoma County justice system data is shared and used 
to inform policy and practice that impacts the jail population. 
 
Strategy 1d: Commit to reporting local data publicly, to ensure that reforms are implemented and 
stakeholders are held accountable.  
As city and county criminal justice agencies improve data collection, and as a CJCC begins collecting and 
analyzing that data to better manage the local justice system and the jail population, data on the 
functioning of the local criminal justice system should be made publicly available. Some counties produce 
“report cards” or “scorecards” that can be viewed by the public.9 These reports often include broader 
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measures of system performance such as public safety rates, incarceration rates, average daily jail 
population, correctional spending, and racial disparities.   
 
Strategy 1e: Use data to analyze racial disparities and track impact of reforms. 
There are a disproportionate number of people of color detained in the Oklahoma County jail. As in most 
local criminal justice systems, these disparities likely emerge across all of the decision points that 
determine the size of the jail population—from arrest through sentencing and post-release supervision. 
Obtaining accurate racial and ethnic data across the system is an essential first step for understanding 
these trends, identifying contributing factors, and developing responsive strategies for reducing 
disparities. For these efforts, it is vital that the various criminal justice agencies use the same categories 
and in their collection of race and ethnicity data. Appendix A provides guidance on improving racial data 
collection efforts.  
 
There is no one-size-fits-all solution for reducing racial and ethnic disparities in criminal justice 
systems. Jurisdictions that have made progress in this area have used a multi-pronged, iterative approach, 
driven by data. Criminal justice reforms, when implemented without attention to differential impact by 
race and ethnicity may, in fact, worsen disparities. Thus, it is vital that stakeholders tasked with 
implementation track outcomes by race and ethnicity.  
 
Reducing racial and ethnic disparities in Dane County, WI 
Even though Dane County, WI (Madison) has significantly lower rates of jail incarceration than the state and 
national average, the local justice system continues to grapple with dramatic racial disparities; a black adult is 
eight times more likely to be arrested than a white adult, and black males make up 43 percent of the jail 
population, despite comprising less than 5 percent of the population. In May of 2015, the Board of Supervisors 
passed Resolution 556 to investigate solutions to racial disparities and mental health challenges in the Dane 
County Jail and local justice system. The resolution established a workgroup comprising three teams tasked 
with producing recommendations for 1) increasing alternatives to arrest; 2) decreasing length of stay; and 3) 
reducing solitary confinement of detainees with mental illness. Taking a data-driven approach, the workgroup 
produced a series of recommendations for reform to the public in September 2015. Recommendations include 
establishing a racial/ethnic equity data analyst position; providing cultural competency training for system 
actors; creating more opportunities for residents to resolve their warrants; increasing the capacity of pretrial 
services and instituting a reminder system; and adding five new members who have been personally impacted 
by incarceration to the Dane County Criminal Justice Council.  
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2. Reduce jail admissions for municipal violations and low level 
misdemeanors 
Key findings and challenges 
 
1. A significant number of individuals with just traffic and/or Oklahoma City municipal charges enter 
the jail. 
According to the Oklahoma City Police Department data from 2015: 
 Of those brought to the jail in 2015, 43 percent had only Oklahoma City municipal charges or 
traffic charges; they were not facing any state misdemeanor or felony charges.  
 Outstanding warrants play a role in who gets booked into the jail; 58 percent of all OCPD 
bookings involved a warrant. 
 Of the 10,453 bookings into the jail that didn’t involve an open warrant, 56 percent were not 
facing charges more serious than an Oklahoma City municipal charge. (See Figure 8.) 
 Municipal warrants are most likely to be for failure to pay fines and fees or failure to appear in 
Oklahoma City Municipal Court. Municipal cases can also involve multiple court appearances, 
which increase the likelihood that someone will fail to appear. Until recently, individuals who 
owed fines and fees to the court but did not have enough money to pay were not regularly given 
waivers or reduced amounts. Instead, they were given long installment agreements on which they 
had multiple opportunities to default and be rearrested. 
 
2. The length of stay of municipal bookings is short, but contributes to overcrowding and delays at the 
jail.  
 The average length of stay of a municipal-only booking is three days (the median is one day).  
 According to the sheriff’s department and other key stakeholders, overcrowding and short-
staffing in the booking area of the jail delays both booking and discharge from the jail; it can now 
take up to 48 hours to fully book someone into the jail. 
 A standing Oklahoma City Municipal Court order from 1997 mandates that individuals booked on 
municipal charges who do not have an existing warrant be released from jail on their own 
recognizance after 10 hours for a Class A charge and after 24 hours for a Class B charge. Release 
times can take longer, however, due to the jail’s severe overcrowding. 
 While originally instituted to speed up the release of people charged with municipal offenses, the 
1997 order now serves to keep people in the jail for no justifiable pretrial purpose.  
 
  
 
 
30  Vera Institute of Justice 
 
 
3.  Oklahoma City, like many jurisdictions, has a group of individuals who are responsible for many 
jail bookings in a single year; they are arrested and booked into the jail repeatedly for lower-level 
offenses. 
 While most people who were arrested by the OCPD in 2015 were arrested and booked into the jail 
only once that year, Vera’s analysis of OCPD data identified 104 individuals who were booked into 
the jail six or more times in 2015 alone. (See Figure 12.) 
 
Figure 12. 
Number of individual annual arrests by OCPD in 2015 
N=18,860 people 
 
 Data from the OCPD gives some additional sense of who these individuals may be. Analysis of 
OCPD arrests shows that the most common charge for someone booked into the jail on a 
municipal charge is public drunkenness. While some of these individuals had accompanying 
charges such as disorderly conduct or trespassing, the majority (973 of 1,358) did not have any 
other charges. 
 
Responsive strategies 
 
The following are recommendations to reduce admissions to the jail for lower-level offenses: Oklahoma 
City charges (Class A violations and Class B misdemeanors), traffic offenses, and some state 
misdemeanors. 
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Strategy 2a: Expand the use of citations, in place of arrest and booking, for municipal charges and 
appropriate state misdemeanor charges. 
A citation issued in lieu of arrest should be the default option for municipal charges absent exigent 
circumstances. The city has been making progress in this direction. The Oklahoma City Municipal 
Counselor’s office is currently working with the OCPD to review the list of municipal offenses considered 
“jailable,” with the goal of increasing the use of citations over arrest for these charges absent an open 
warrant. Previously, arrest and booking has been the default response for Class B violations (the more 
serious municipal charges) unless the arresting officer obtains approval from a supervisor for a field 
release, in which case an individual gets a ticket with a court date. Once OCPD and the municipal 
counselor establish their new policy, field release will be the default response for the majority of Class B 
charges.  
In addition to municipal charges, state law permits law enforcement officers to issue citations in lieu 
of arrest for state misdemeanors.10 OCPD, in collaboration with the district attorney, should identify state 
misdemeanor charges for which a citation or book and release (see Strategy 2b) would be appropriate.  
The decision to arrest someone versus some other police action is also often influenced by internal 
performance and evaluation metrics. In order to reduce arrests and jail bookings for traffic and city 
violations, the department should review internal practices and revise any policies that incentivize arrest 
over citation.  
 
Strategy 2b: In situations where citations are not appropriate, allow individuals to be booked and 
released, eliminating the 10/24 hour hold order.  
Using citations in lieu of arrest in New Orleans 
As part of its jail reduction efforts, the New Orleans City Council passed an ordinance in 2008 that requires 
city police to use a citation in lieu of arrest for municipal violations absent special circumstances and charges 
(primarily domestic violence and DUI cases). In 2010, the city council passed an ordinance that allows local 
law enforcement officers to write tickets for people being charged with a first-time marijuana possession 
offense rather than make an arrest. In response to the 2010 marijuana ordinance, the New Orleans Police 
Department adopted a policy that instructs officers to treat small amounts of marijuana possession as a 
municipal offense, thus mandating the use of citations in most circumstances. After going into effect, 70 
percent of people charged with simple possession of marijuana were issued a summons rather than brought 
to jail. From 2011 to 2014, arrests for marijuana possession decreased 31 percent. Importantly, data show 
that officers’ discretion to use citations was applied equally to black and white residents. In March 2016, the 
city council voted to expand the use of summonses in lieu of arrests for third and subsequent simple 
possession charges.  
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“Book and release” is an intermediate step between a citation and a full jail booking, particularly 
appropriate where citation would usually be given but law enforcement cannot determine the identity of 
the individual in the field. In larger jurisdictions like Milwaukee and New York, a form of book and release 
is done at district police stations, avoiding the jail altogether. Individuals are arrested, brought in, 
fingerprinted and background-checked, and released on their own recognizance with a citation and court 
date. Oklahoma City is adapting a space for these purposes in the new municipal courthouse, which opens 
in 2017. This will enable law enforcement officers to bring individuals arrested on city charges to the 
courthouse during business hours where they will be either brought before a judge or fingerprinted, given 
a court date, and released immediately.   
While this change will reduce bookings during business hours, it will not address those who are 
arrested on nights or weekends, which is when the majority of arrests happen. The city and OCSO should 
work towards creating a separate booking area at the jail or elsewhere where municipal arrestees could be 
brought, processed, and released on their own recognizance during hours when the courthouse is closed. 
Enabling book and release 24/7 will facilitate the elimination of the 10/24 hour hold policy for Class A 
and B offenses.   
For people booked into the jail on traffic violations by OCPD, the most common charge is not having a 
state driver’s license in possession at the time of the law enforcement encounter. Book and release is an 
ideal solution for this population and will help reduce jail admissions for traffic violations.  
Milwaukee: Using book and release in an urban area 
Milwaukee County, WI is working to reduce its jail population and racial and ethnic disparities in its criminal 
justice system. One strategy to achieve these aims is the expansion of the city’s book and release policy for 
low-level, non-violent misdemeanors, formerly available only in suburban areas of Milwaukee. Previously, 
book and release depended on cash bail; defendants had to post bond in order to be released directly from 
the station and spared jail. The Milwaukee Police Department has recently authorized officers who work in the 
city’s center, which has a higher concentration of people of color and people in poverty, to use book and 
release. Defendants will be released on their own recognizance from district stations and reminded to appear 
for their court hearing, reducing unnecessary jail admissions. 
Reducing failure to appear warrants and criminal justice expenditures with robust  
reminder systems 
Multnomah County, OR (Portland) established the Court Appearance Notification System (CANS), an automated 
calling system, in 2005. CANS resulted in positive outcomes almost immediately. In the first six months, 
Multnomah’s failure to appear rate dropped 37 percent and resulted in more than $250,000 in net cost-
avoidance to the local criminal justice system. 
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Strategy 2c: Reduce jail admissions of people with warrants for municipal and traffic violations by 
instituting a court date notification system in the municipal court and reducing arrests for failure to 
pay. 
As noted previously, 35 percent of those booked into jail by OCPD with open warrants had warrants 
related to municipal and/or traffic violations. These warrants are likely a result of failure-to-pay tickets 
and other fees and/or missed court dates.   
 Instituting a court reminder system is a proven strategy to help ensure that people show up for their 
court dates. Evidence-based notification systems remind individuals with pending court appearances of 
the date, time, and location of their next court date. Some research has shown that live callers are most 
effective, but automated texts have also been shown to reduce failure to appear rates, warrants, and 
subsequent court and jail bed costs.11 
 
The Oklahoma City Municipal Court is currently looking at two strategies to reduce arrests on warrants 
for failing to pay fines, fees, and court costs. The court has made Rule 8 hearings—which are used to 
determine indigency and can provide some relief from court costs and fines—more frequent and has given 
people access to those hearings before they default on a payment, rather than after. In addition, the court 
will modify its data system to allow officers in the field to know when a municipal warrant is for failure to 
pay only. At present, officers cannot distinguish when a warrant has been generated for failure to pay, 
failure to appear, or another circumstance. Police will now have options other than arrest when they 
encounter individuals with failure-to-pay warrants, such as bringing them to the municipal courthouse to 
meet with a judge. These strategies will help reduce admissions to jail for failure or inability to pay 
criminal justice costs. Outcomes should be tracked and monitored. 
 
Strategy 2d: Form an interdisciplinary team to identify and develop targeted responses to chronic low-
level offenders. 
Practically every community in the United States is faced with the challenge of a small, but incredibly 
costly, subset of individuals who cycle in and out of a community’s jail, hospitals, and treatment centers. 
Referred to as “high-utilizers” (or sometimes “frequent users” or “frequent fliers”), the majority of these 
individuals face difficult behavioral health and substance abuse issues, bounce from institution to 
institution, and tax their communities’ limited programs and services.  
Research from other jurisdictions points to the likelihood that the 104 individuals admitted to 
Oklahoma County jail six or more times in 2015 suffer from mental illness, addiction, or both. For 
example, in 2012, Snohomish County, WA analyzed its 23 residents who had nine or more bookings into 
the county jail during a 10-month period.12 Twenty-one of these 23 individuals had a mental illness, a 
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drug or alcohol disorder, or both. In just 10 months, these high-utilizers had 300 visits combined to 
mental health centers, hospitals, emergency rooms, and other medical services. Similarly, Miami-Dade 
County, FL analyzed the costs of its highest utilizers with mental illness. Researchers found that over four 
years, 97 residents spent a combined 39,000 days in jail, emergency rooms, state hospitals, or psychiatric 
facilities—costing an astounding $13.7 million.13 (See Strategy 5b for more about Miami-Dade’s mental 
health diversion efforts.)  
Oklahoma City currently has two main non-arrest options for individuals who may be high-utilizers. 
Officers may bring an individual believed to be in crisis due to mental illness to the Crisis Intervention 
Center and they can bring someone who is drunk to a sobering center. Stakeholders have stated that the 
sobering center is not over capacity, yet individuals charged with public drunkenness are still being 
brought to jail. According to the OCPD, those who end up arrested for public drunkenness may have 
either refused to go or been refused entry to the sobering center because of past or current disruptive 
behavior. 
To better understand this population of high-utilizers, an interdisciplinary team should conduct 
further analysis. In other jurisdictions such teams have included professionals representing the local jail, 
hospitals, treatment centers, and the mental health community to share data and resources. The team 
should take a closer look at these individuals to better understand gaps in care and potential intervention 
points. Law enforcement and behavioral health services can work together to create intervention plans 
that target needs and decrease arrest and incarceration. This group should also look at how the sobering 
center is being used, and whether its policies and practices are appropriately matched to Oklahoma City’s 
public safety needs. 
 
Strategy 2e: Eliminate the practice of dual charging for applicable offenses. 
Currently, individuals who could be charged by the police with either a municipal or state charge because 
of the nature of the offense are charged with both types of offenses. By charging people with both state 
and local charges, individuals are routed to the jail and into the district court. Because state charges carry 
higher bail amounts, there is a greater likelihood that they will linger in jail. Those who do not bail out 
could wait in jail 10 days or longer before the district attorney’s office accepts or declines the state 
charge(s). If the state charges are dismissed, the defendant will then be released on his own recognizance 
and the city charge sent to the city prosecutor for review. By the time a state charge is declined by the 
prosecutor, the defendant will have likely already been in jail for an extended period, which not only 
unnecessarily fills a jail bed, but also has negative consequences for the individual. The OCPD and the 
district attorney should review all charges that can be filed at either the municipal or state level and 
identify those for which municipal charges should be officers’ default option. This will ensure that the 
people facing these charges will benefit from the other municipal reforms described in this section. To the 
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extent that OCPD already defaults to municipal charging in many cases, it would be useful for the district 
attorney’s office to undertake a review of cases they decline to prosecute to determine whether OCPD and 
district attorney policy and practice align. 
 
 
3. Create a fair and efficient pretrial release process that safely 
reduces unnecessary pretrial incarceration 
Key findings and challenges 
 
1. The vast majority of people incarcerated in the Oklahoma County jail are classified as being in 
pretrial detention.  
 As discussed in the Data Analysis section (see page 10), Vera’s researchers were unable to 
determine which people incarcerated in the jail were pretrial, which were awaiting a hearing on a 
post-sentencing violation (such as failure to pay fines, fees, or costs), and which faced both. Data 
reported by the county to the Federal Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that the vast majority 
of incarcerated people are considered pretrial, although this data likely has the same weakness as 
the county’s data. In 2014, the most recently reported year, 84 percent of detainees were classified 
as awaiting trial. (See Figure 13.)  
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Figure 13.  
Percentage of the Oklahoma County jail population awaiting trial (1970-2014) 
 
 
2. In Oklahoma County, individuals’ ability (or lack of ability) to pay financial bail determines who 
stays in the jail and who waits at home while a decision is made about their guilt or innocence.   
 Bail is set cumulatively for each arresting charge. This means that a person with several low-level 
charges from a single encounter with police may have a higher bond set than someone charged 
with a single but more serious crime. For instance, a person charged with failing to signal a lane 
change ($500 bond), failing to stop at a stop sign ($500), and driving on a suspended license 
($1,000 bond) will have a higher bond than someone charged with assault and battery ($500 
bond).  
  Individual bond amounts are determined not by a judge reviewing an individual case but by a 
preset bond schedule, which assigns a bond amount for each charge. The bond schedule for state 
charges is created and authorized by district court; municipal court oversees the bond schedule 
for city charges.   
 Defendants’ likelihood of showing up to court, their risk to public safety, and their ability to afford 
to pay bail are not taken into account in the majority of pretrial decisions.  
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 In a cash-based system, wealthier defendants can bond out regardless of the danger they pose to 
the community, while less affluent defendants may be held on small amounts of bail even for non-
violent misdemeanors. 
 
3. Judges are not provided with necessary information about defendants’ risk-level that would assist 
them in making informed pretrial release decisions.  
 The criminal justice field has developed accurate tools known as pretrial risk assessment 
instruments which can be administered to defendants to quickly predict their risk of failing to 
appear in court and of committing a new crime if released into the community. Court services and 
district court do not use a validated pretrial risk assessment tool.  
 Instead of using the results of a validated pretrial risk assessment, the special judge simply recites 
the bond amount to defendants who have not made bail at a probable cause hearing held 72 hours 
after arrest. He does not make an individualized assessment or pretrial release determination for 
defendants.  
 
4. The county lacks adequate nonfinancial release options, including a range of community-based 
alternatives to pretrial incarceration.  
 Oklahoma County Court Services operates a program that facilitates nonfinancial release for a 
small number of individuals pending trial or plea for state charges. These are conditional release 
(CR) and own recognizance (OR) bonds. Under CR release, defendants are placed on a form of 
community supervision such as GPS monitoring or mandated programming at the NorthCare Day 
Reporting Center, a private agency. While CR defendants don’t pay bond, they must pay 
associated costs for their supervision ($40 to $100 per month based on supervision level) or GPS 
monitoring ($126 per month). Under OR release, the defendant does not need to post any money 
up front in order to secure release, but will owe the court money (equivalent to the bond) if she or 
he does not show up in court.  
 The process used by court services to evaluate defendants and make recommendations to judges 
on OR and CR release is not evidence-based and does not include an individual assessment using 
a validated pretrial risk assessment tool.  
 The CR and OR options are underutilized and do not make a large impact on the jail population. 
In 2015, of the 39,349 total admissions to the county jail, only 986 people were released on OR 
bond and only 462 were released on CR bond (less than 4 percent combined). 
  
 
 
38  Vera Institute of Justice 
 
 
 State law excludes individuals facing certain charges from being eligible for release into a pretrial 
services program.14 A district court judge has the discretion to override those exclusions for 
individuals, but a special judge, not a district court judge, currently oversees the release decision 
during the probable cause hearing. Individuals who might be good candidates for OR or CR 
release often wait for weeks in jail to get in front of a district court judge.   
 Oklahoma County places further restrictions on the use of court services pretrial supervision, so 
that some individuals who are not covered by the state exclusions are ineligible under county 
policy. The county policy, for example, allows exclusion from supervision for anyone with a prior 
failure to appear regardless of the length of time since that failure or the total number of 
appearances actually made. 
 The process for judicial approval for release on CR and OR bonds is protracted, which leads to 
unnecessarily long pretrial detention for individuals who will eventually be released into the 
community before the resolution of their cases.   
 According to Oklahoma law, the district court may release individuals on personal recognizance, 
whether or not they are referred to pretrial service programs like those run by court services. They 
have a bond amount set, but they do not have to pay it; the amount will be subject to a judgment if 
the individual fails to appear in court. This option appears to be rarely used independently of the 
court services pretrial release program. 
 
 
Responsive strategies 
 
The decision whether, when, and how to release individuals from jail who have been charged but not yet 
convicted of an offense significantly influences the size of a jail population. In the United States, pretrial 
release is the presumption; the only constitutional justification for holding someone in jail before they are 
convicted of a crime is when there is a likelihood that he or she will not appear in court and/or poses a 
serious risk to public safety. Due process protections, as well as Oklahoma State law, require that this 
decision be based on an individualized assessment of a defendant, taking into account risk of flight, risk to 
the community, and financial means.15  
This section includes three sets of recommendations for 1) individualizing pretrial release 
determinations and expanding nonfinancial pretrial release options; 2) addressing high and inconsistent 
bond amounts; and 3) moving from a cash-based to a risk-based system in the longer term. The first two 
sets of recommendations can be implemented rather quickly and do not require substantial structural 
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changes. The latter series of recommendations will require a greater, but necessary, investment in 
resources and paradigmatic shift within the county’s criminal justice system.  
 
Individualize pretrial release decisions and expand nonfinancial release options  
Strategy 3a: Expedite screening and assessment of those in jail who appear to qualify for OR or CR 
release.  
Individuals who qualify for OR and CR nonfinancial release can still spend weeks in jail awaiting 
screening and judicial approval. The court services recommendation for OR and CR is not available to the 
special judge conducting probable cause hearings the first time the defendant appears in front of the judge 
in court. By improving efficiencies in the booking process, providing the space and time for court services 
to complete timely review and make recommendations, and giving the special court judge the ability to 
consider OR or CR release at the first appearance, individuals who qualify can be released much more 
quickly. A team of Oklahoma County stakeholders, composed of representatives from the offices of the 
sheriff, district attorney, public defender, court services, the district court, and the county have developed 
a proposal to implement these changes. Key components to be implemented include: 
 
 Reconfiguring the booking area in the jail to provide space for court services to operate in the jail and 
screening people immediately as they come in. 
 Expanding the hours of court services to include high volume nights and weekends. 
 Providing court services’ recommendations to the special court judge in advance of the probable cause 
hearing.  
 Issuance of a standing order by the presiding district court judge authorizing the special judge to 
release individuals on OR or CR bonds at the probable cause hearing; the standing order will list 
charges that would be presumptively eligible for OR release, absent a valid specific reason to hold 
them. 16 
 
Strategy 3b: Expand eligibility for OR/CR bond release. 
Although the state statute authorizing nonfinancial release excludes a number of offenses, most people in 
the Oklahoma County jail are not charged with those offenses; however, they are still being excluded from 
OR/CR release.17 The barrier appears to occur because individuals are being screened out by court 
services according to restrictions placed by the Oklahoma County Board of Commissioners. As such, the 
Oklahoma County Board of Commissioners, court services, the district court presiding judge, the district 
attorney, and the public defender should review data on who is and is not being released to court services 
to identify types of defendants who have been excluded but may actually be good candidates.   
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The district court should also approve a standing order authorizing the special judge sitting in 
probable cause hearings to consider release on OR/CR bond on a case by case basis, where release is 
appropriate and acceptable to the district attorney.   
  
Strategy 3c: Provide counsel for defendants at probable cause hearings.  
Early assignment of council is an effective strategy for reducing unnecessary pretrial detention.18 The 
public defender’s office currently operates a pilot—funded by a private grant and supported by The 
Education and Employment Ministry (TEEM)—that provides for a part-time public defender at probable 
cause hearings. Authorized by the presiding district court judge, the special judge presiding over these 
hearings has considered downward departures from the bail schedule at the request of the public 
defender. While data on outcomes are still being collected, the public defender’s office believes this has 
enabled more individuals to achieve reduced bonds and get out of jail without a negative impact on public 
safety.  
Representation at the probable cause hearing represents a positive move towards individualized 
release determinations and departure from the bail schedule. It protects individuals from being deprived 
of their liberty without due process of law. Also, having a public defender in probable cause hearings will 
ensure that indigent defendants who are released on OR or CR bonds or on lowered amounts of bail are 
properly assigned counsel for the duration of their cases. However, the current position is likely 
temporary, as it is funded by a private source and needs to be supported by a long-term sustainable 
funding stream. 
 
Reduce high and inconsistent bond amounts  
There is no evidence that financial bonds are effective in preventing a defendant’s failure to appear. A key 
study by the Pretrial Justice Institute of a sample of Colorado counties found that individuals released on 
unsecured bonds (where the defendant does not post any money up front prior to release) did not have 
statistically significant different failure to appear rates or reoffending rates compared to those released on 
secured bonds.19 Not surprisingly, defendants with secured bonds had much longer lengths of stay in jail 
before securing release than the defendants with unsecured bonds.20 Furthermore, there is no research 
indicating that money bonds have any impact on the likelihood of committing new offenses while in the 
community.21 Cash bonds disproportionately impact low-income individuals, including women and 
people of color who are more likely to be poor.22 The disproportionate incarceration of black people in 
Oklahoma County and the high rates of incarceration for women may derive in part from the prevailing 
use of money bail. Shifting away from a cash-based system is possible, but requires long-term 
commitment and the reallocation of local resources. However, there are immediate steps the district court 
could take to mitigate the negative consequences of a money bail-based system.  
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Strategy 3d: Calculate bail amounts based on the highest charge, not cumulatively. 
Under current practice, bail amounts are calculated cumulatively based on each charge a defendant is 
booked on. This practice raises the total bond amount even for people facing lower level charges, who are 
often charged with multiple minor offenses. Unaffordable bond amounts increase defendants’ lengths of 
stay and the jail’s pretrial population. As an alternative, bail should be assigned according to a defendant’s 
most serious charge. This change will not require any amendments to local or state law and could be 
enacted immediately by district court.  
 
Strategy 3e: Expand the use of personal recognizance bonds. 
Because monetary conditions have no appreciable impact on pretrial outcomes, there is no benefit to 
requiring a monetary deposit to secure release, particularly if the bail amount is low. Currently, personal 
recognizance bonds, which are unsecured by a cash deposit or a third party surety (bail bondsmen), are 
only used in the context of the pretrial services program run by court services. However, Oklahoma law 
allows for the use of personal recognizance bonds and judges are not restricted to using them only in the 
context of pretrial services. Where the bail amount set by the schedule would be low, but the amount is 
still prohibitive for a defendant, the district court should use its discretion to release individuals on 
personal recognizance bonds.  
 
 
Strategy 3f: Institute a bail review at arraignment. 
In-custody defendants, unless able to afford private counsel, are not assigned a public defender until they 
have been formally arraigned. Arraignment is the hearing during which defendants are informed of the 
formal charges against them by the district attorney’s office. It typically takes place a week after the 
probable cause hearing and 10 days after jail booking. Arraignment could provide a good opportunity to 
review the original pretrial release decision; if an individual has been given a relatively low bail amount 
The impact of evidence-based pretrial policy in Charlotte, NC 
After implementing a new evidence-based pretrial policy in 2010, Mecklenburg County, NC (Charlotte) saw 
positive results almost immediately. Average bond amounts decreased 30 percent and release on unsecured 
bonds (which do not require the defendant to post any money up front but will owe the court that money if he 
absconds) increased from 2 percent to 21 percent in just the first year. Although more people were released in 
the community pending trial, the rates of re-arrest and failure to appear for pretrial defendants remained the 
same and the jail population declined. Mecklenburg has continued to implement a suite of local reforms, 
successfully reducing its jail population by over 33 percent from 2009 to 2014. 
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but is still in the jail solely because she cannot afford to get out, the court should consider whether 
continuing to hold her represents a just and appropriate use of a jail bed and explore other options, such 
as personal recognizance release.  
 
Move from a cash-based to risk-based system in the long term 
In the longer term, Oklahoma County stakeholders should seriously examine their pretrial release 
decision-making system to ensure that it comports with the county’s public safety priorities and evidence-
based policy and practices. Individualized release decisions informed by a validated risk-assessment tool 
and the availability of a range of pretrial release and supervision options—with an understanding that 
pretrial release is the default and not the exception—represent the highest standards of practice in the 
field and Oklahoma County should aim to meet those standards.    
 
Strategy 3g: Develop a comprehensive understanding among Oklahoma County criminal justice system 
stakeholders of pretrial risk and evidence-based practices in pretrial decision making. 
Systems that use results of an evidence-based risk tool to guide pretrial decision making see both 
improvements to public safety and declines in the jail population.23 Making the change in Oklahoma 
County, however, will require a major paradigm shift for all system stakeholders around pretrial safety 
and release, and this does not come easily.  Jurisdictions that have done this successfully have undertaken 
education and communications strategies to reach all branches of the criminal justice system, including 
the judiciary, defense (including the private bar), the prosecutor’s office, and the public at large. 
Oklahoma County will have to include this kind of effort as both a precursor to and an ongoing part of 
system change.    
 
Strategy 3h: Identify and implement a pretrial risk assessment tool to guide judges’ decisions about 
pretrial release. 
The use of an objective, research-based risk assessment instrument by pretrial services agencies to assist 
judicial officers in making decisions is strongly recommended by both the American Bar Association and 
the National Association of Pretrial Agencies.24 These tools measure defendants’ likelihood of failure to 
appear in court and their danger to the community if released. Risk tools are not designed to replace 
judicial discretion around pretrial release but to inform it. Any instrument used to assess a defendant’s 
risk should be validated to ensure it accurately predicts pretrial risk in the community in which it is being 
applied. There are many accurate pretrial risk assessment tools available today and the county should 
identify one that is the best fit. 
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Strategy 3i: Expand nonfinancial pretrial release options and implement evidence-based pretrial 
community supervision practices.  
A validated pretrial risk assessment tool will provide judicial officers with accurate assessments of 
defendants’ risks of flight and of committing a new crime pending trial. Defendants’ scores will range 
from very low-risk to high-risk. Oklahoma County will then need a range of options to respond 
appropriately to each risk category; properly assigning individuals to different levels of supervision will 
also help the county allocate criminal justice resources effectively. For example, defendants assessed to be 
at low-risk can be released into the community with limited intervention, usually just calls or text 
reminders of upcoming court dates. Over-supervising or intervening with this population can have 
adverse impacts and actually increase failure to appear rates.25  Moderate-risk defendants will be more 
successful in the community with oversight by court services, with supervision and conditions matched to 
both risk and needs to be kept in jail for public safety reasons.26  
 
 
4.   Identify and address district court case processing delays that 
increase jail admissions and length of stay 
Key findings and challenges 
 
1. Case processing times are lengthy.   
 While the average length of stay for individuals entering the jail is 21 days, the jail is filled with 
people who are staying much longer than that. The one-day snapshot of the jail population on 
June 1, 2015 revealed that one-third of incarcerated people (767) had been incarcerated for six 
months or longer and 376 people had been there for longer than a year. (See Figure 14.) 
 
Elimination of Cash Bail: District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia has nearly eliminated the use of financial bonds while maintaining an 88 percent 
success rate for individuals released pretrial. Defendants are screened using a risk assessment tool by the 
Pretrial Services Agency, and approximately 80 percent are released without financial conditions, 5 percent 
are released with financial conditions, and 15 percent are held in jail. A statutory provision allows for financial 
conditions to assure court appearance, but only if it does not result in unintended preventive detention, so 
financial bond is used rarely.  The law also allows for detention without bail in instances where a defendant 
needs to be kept in jail for public safety reasons. 
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Figure 14.  
Number of people in jail by days in jail on June 1, 2015 
N=2,321 
 
 Case processing time—the amount of time from filing of official charges to the resolution of a case 
(e.g. a plea agreement, a conviction, a dismissal of charges)—is a key driver of long jail lengths of stay. 
While the jail data does not allow us to say much about who is staying so long in the jail, data from the 
Oklahoma Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) indicate that case processing times in the district 
court are slow. For people charged with misdemeanors, the average time from filing of charges to 
disposition in Oklahoma County in 2015 was 383 days, which is longer than the possible sentence for 
misdemeanor charges. The average time for all felony cases was 432 days, well over a year. Vera was 
not able to obtain administrative data from the courts that would allow for deeper analysis of what 
drives these delays, or whether case processing times varied based on whether someone was in or out 
of custody. 
 
2. System stakeholders identified numerous possible systemic drivers of case processing delays, none 
of which could be fully assessed by the Task Force because of data limitations. 
Systemic problems include: 
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 The length of time from arrest to the filing of official charges by the district attorney’s office is 
lengthy. It takes 10 days on average for charges to be filed for those who are booked into the jail 
and do not get out on bail. It often takes much longer for those who do get out. They may attend 
more than one court date awaiting formal charging. If they are not charged initially, they may be 
charged at some point in the future, without any notice to them. A warrant will then be issued for 
their arrest, and they will be admitted a second time and will have to pay bail again. The charging 
backlog is attributed in part to resource constraints at the district attorney’s office. 
 Neither public defenders nor prosecutors are assigned to a case until after arraignment. This 
means that individuals may be in jail for weeks before talking to a public defender and that it is 
impossible to move even simple cases to plea or diversion until weeks after booking.  
 Public defenders face serious delays in being able to contact clients in jail. Jail overcrowding and 
short-staffing, as well as physical space constraints, restrict access. Delayed access to clients leads 
to slower case processing and longer jail stays. 
 Individuals who make bail, regardless of how low the amount they paid to the court or a bail 
bondsman, are presumed to be ineligible for a public defender. Cases can be delayed while they 
look for an attorney they can afford or document their inability to afford counsel. Private 
attorneys may delay cases until they get paid and the court accommodates those delays, 
increasing case processing time.   
 The “culture of continuances” is not just limited to the private bar. Stakeholders shared that it is 
also common for prosecutors and public defenders to request continuances and that these are 
granted by the court. 
 There is a lack of coordination between the court and the sheriff’s office around the transporting 
of individuals to court. Resource limitations at the jail make it difficult to transport all inmates 
whose cases are on the court calendar that day. The sheriff’s office will bring too many or too few 
to the courthouse, leading to logistical challenges and further delays at the courthouse. These 
issues may also be attributable, in part, to docketing issues on the court’s side.  
 Overcrowding and resource constraints at the jail delay both booking and release, lengthening the 
amount of time people spend in jail. 
 
3. Case processing delays may be contributing to the high numbers of warrants, which in turn 
increases admissions into the jail.  
 Warrants are generated for many reasons, including failure to appear in court, failure to pay fines, 
fees, or costs, violations of probation, and when charges are filed and the defendant is not in 
custody at the time. Copious open warrants lead to increased jail admissions because law 
enforcement must make an arrest when they encounter someone with a warrant. The data show 
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that almost half of people booked into the jail on warrants by OCPD were not facing any 
additional charges besides their open warrant (See Figure 15). 
Figure 15.  
Most significant charges of people booked into jail on warrants, 2015 
n=14,489 people 
 Extending a case with multiple court appearances and adjournments increases the likelihood that 
someone will miss an appearance and a warrant will issue, leading to further delays and more jail 
admissions. 
 
4. Bail bondsmen can re-incarcerate a client in the jail without any due process or even notification to 
the court.  
 Known as “surrender on bond,” bondsmen merely need to present a defendant and the required 
paperwork to the jail and the jail has to automatically take custody of the defendant.27 Bond 
surrender was one of the top 10 reasons for admission among all people admitted to jail in 2015—
there were 1,441 bond surrenders that year.  
 Those who were admitted solely on bond surrender had a much longer average length of stay (38 
days), as compared to the general average of 21 days.  
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 Currently, there is no policy for notifying the court and relevant parties such as attorneys that 
bond surrender has occurred. This can lead to serious confusion and further case delays, 
increasing length of stay.  
 
Responsive strategies 
 
Strategy 4a: Expedite time to charging particularly for out-of-custody defendants.  
Long times to charging by the district attorney are the beginning point of case processing delays and may 
also lead to the proliferation of warrants. Until recently, according to the district attorney, the average 
time to charging for out-of-custody cases was three months. A temporary investment in staff overtime 
brought charging time down to three weeks, but the backlog will build up again if a systemic fix is not 
developed. If Oklahoma County increases the number of people released pretrial, one of the most 
important strategies for jail reduction, backlogs, and case processing times could increase. 
While resource constraints are in part to blame for these lags, a thorough review of protocols and 
practices will identify inefficiencies that can be addressed administratively. Other jurisdictions have 
achieved efficiencies by having more senior attorneys make filing decisions, opening up lines of 
communication between the police and the district attorney’s office to identify cases that the police should 
charge at the city rather than county level (see Strategy 2e), and providing for early case conferencing to 
triage cases (see Strategy 4c), among other approaches. 
 
Strategy 4b: Notify out-of-custody defendants once charges have been filed. 
Once charges are filed by the district attorney, defendants who are not in custody should be notified and 
given their next court date. Under the current system, defendants may be rearrested for failing to appear 
for a court date about which they had no notice. This system is grossly burdensome on defendants, leads 
to arrests for non-criminal behavior, and wastes jail beds and court time. An individual who returns to 
court following such a notice should not be required to post bond again since she has demonstrated that 
she is engaged in her case and is not a flight risk. 
 
Strategy 4c: Develop a capacity to sort cases, identifying those that can be fast tracked or diverted. 
Not all cases that pass through the county district courthouse are equally complex.  Other jurisdictions 
have identified ways to expedite cases that don’t involve witnesses or extensive discovery, do not have the 
potential for any or extensive prison time, and/or when the defendant and his counsel are ready to plea to 
charges. An expediting team from the district attorney’s office and the public defender’s office should be 
established to conference and agree on cases that can be resolved at or soon after arraignment, including 
  
 
 
48  Vera Institute of Justice 
 
 
expedited referral to diversion programs. The district court can designate a specific docket for resolving 
these cases, with expedited discovery dates, as needed. 
 
Strategy 4d: Consider implementing proven strategies for reducing case backlogs.   
Jurisdictions with significant case backlogs have used backlog dockets, sometimes called “rocket dockets,” 
to clear cases that have been lingering in the courts too long. Clearing cases that have been open for an 
extended period will impact the jail by targeting longer stays. If a judge skilled at case management is put 
in charge of this kind of docket, cases can be resolved or set for a specific date. Other jurisdictions, such as 
New York City, have demonstrated success in clearing cases using this method.  Another strategy is to 
implement time standards for case processing, based on the type of case. Bernalillo County, NM 
(Albuquerque) has made impressive reductions of its jail population, in part because its courts have 
instituted strict deadlines for case resolution.28  
Before instituting any of these strategies, a team from the court should undertake an investigation 
into case processing delays, potentially by reviewing a representative sample of cases from the district 
court. This review should analyze both misdemeanors and felonies as well as in-custody and out-of-
custody cases.  
 
Strategy 4e: Implement a court notification system in the district court to reduce failure to appear. 
As noted above with regard to the municipal court, evidence-based court notification systems have been 
shown to reduce failures to appear, thereby increasing case processing efficiency and reducing warrants. 
The county should institute such a system. It should also be used to notify people who are not in custody 
that charges have been filed against them by the district attorney and provide them with a court date. A 
reminder system could also be used to alert those who are behind on payments of their criminal justice 
debt and refer them to a court date at the cost docket, reducing the number of people who end up in jail 
on cost warrants.  
 
Strategy 4f: Prioritize access to counsel in the jail.  
Earlier access will allow attorneys to get an earlier start in prepping cases and will enable the defendant to 
more readily assist with his own defense. Delayed or denied access to clients in jail increases length of 
stay, as it justifies additional continuances, delays the relaying of plea offers and acceptance, and makes it 
difficult for defendants to assist in the preparation of their cases.  
 
Strategy 4g: Review practices and procedures for bond surrender.  
There is limited information about when bond surrender occurs and whether there is a mechanism for 
averting that process. Stakeholders need to gain clarity on the reasons for bond surrender. Notification 
  
 
 
49  Vera Institute of Justice 
 
 
from the jail to the courts, the district attorney’s office, and defense counsel once someone is surrendered 
on bond will allow the courts to expedite those cases or perhaps allow the defendant to be released on 
nonfinancial release. The city and county may want to consider pursuing a legislative remedy to this 
problem.  
 
Strategy 4h: Institute a periodic warrant resolution program.  
As a first step to reducing the number of open warrants, municipalities, counties, courts, and district 
attorneys around the country have sponsored programs to encourage people with outstanding warrants 
on lower level charges to come in and resolve their cases on their own volition. Tulsa recently held such a 
program for municipal warrants.29 These events, usually conducted in an accessible location like a church 
or a downtown library, provide an opportunity for individuals with warrants to either address the issue on 
the spot with a judge or to receive a court date to do so at a later date. Individuals can be screened initially 
by a public defender, who can identify whether they have cases that can be resolved that day or if they 
need to seek further legal advice. Warrant resolution programs help courts clear their warrant backlogs, 
reduce arrests and unnecessary jail bookings, and allow individuals in the community to resolve old 
problems that may be holding them back.   
 
 
5.  Expand meaningful diversion program options, focusing on those 
with mental illness and substance use disorders 
 
Key findings and challenges 
 
1. Individuals with addiction, mental illness, or both come into the Oklahoma County jail at 
disproportionately high rates.  
 The sheriff’s office reports that about 12 percent of its daily population has been identified to have 
a serious mental illness; this is twice the rate of the broader county population, but most likely 
underestimates the number of individuals with mental illness in the jail.30  
 Exact figures on the number of people in the jail with substance use disorders are unavailable, but 
the most frequent felony charge among those entering the jail, representing almost 20 percent of 
all felony charges, is simple drug possession. The most frequent misdemeanor charges among 
those entering the jail, representing almost 25 percent of all misdemeanor charges, are possession 
of drug paraphernalia and drug possession. The top municipal charge is public intoxication.  
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 Data from Oklahoma Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services indicate that over 115,000 
adults in Oklahoma County have mental health needs, and almost 50,000 are in need of 
substance abuse treatment.31 
 
2. Oklahoma County does not have sufficient diversion options to keep individuals with behavioral 
health needs out of the jail and address the underlying problems that cause them to come into 
contact, some repeatedly, with the criminal justice system.  
 The OCPD has officers who have received Crisis Intervention Training to respond to people with 
mental illness who are in crisis, but there are insufficient crisis beds to support referrals, and 
officers sometimes must drive long distances to bring individuals to crisis or treatment services. 
This takes officers off the street for hours at a time. 
 Individuals are now screened for mental illness and substance use disorders at the jail through 
the Offender Screening Program run by the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse 
Services, but the screening is not currently being used to flag individuals for early diversion. 
 Diversion programs exist, including the Drug Court, DUI Court, Mental Health Court, 
Regimented Offender Discipline (RID), the County Veteran’s Program, and ReMerge (for 
women), but their numbers are small and their reach is limited.      
 
3. The process of referral and assessment for entry into a county specialty court is a protracted 
process, leading to longer jail stays and delays to treatment and rehabilitation.  
 Criminal justice system stakeholders agree that it takes on average 60 days from jail booking for 
someone to be accepted into a diversion program. The delay appears to be caused by a number of 
factors including a lack of early screening and other case processing issues which delay charging 
and assignment of counsel, and the lack of a structure to support early case resolution (see 
Section 4). 
 Because of this protracted process, candidates for diversion sit in jail pretrial for extended 
periods. While the programs provide an alternative to incarceration as a sentence, they do not 
serve to divert individuals from traditional case processing or from pretrial incarceration, which 
wastes jail beds and delays access to treatment.   
 
4. Specialty court requirements, including length of required participation and the cost of 
participation, can be unduly burdensome, which deter enrollment.  
 While data on the referral process to specialty courts, the number of people who accept or don’t 
accept diversion offers, and the failure and success rates of those who participate are not 
available, the scale of the programs relative to the size of the population in the jail with behavioral 
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health problems suggest that these programs are not reaching all of the people who are in need of 
treatment.     
 Criminal justice system stakeholders suggest that the cost of these programs, which require 
payment for participation and auxiliary costs like drug tests, on top of payment for court costs, 
supervision fees, and other fines and costs, serve as a disincentive to enrollment and is a common 
reason for program failures.   
 
 
Responsive strategies 
 
Strategy 5a: Identify and enroll participants in specialty courts earlier in the criminal justice process.  
The judiciary and the offices of the district attorney and the public defender should work together to 
troubleshoot the specialty court enrollment process and pinpoint earlier intervention points for diversion. 
One possibility is to flag individuals for possible referral to diversion during the expanded expedited 
pretrial release process described in Strategy 3a. The parties have discussed integrating the Department of 
Mental Health’s Offender Screening program, which uses the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS) 
risk/needs assessment tool, into the booking process, as a companion process to medical screening. This 
would allow for screening results to be available to the courts, prosecutor, and defender by the time of the 
arraignment hearing.  
 
Strategy 5b: Invest in a continuum of diversion programming. 
Criminal justice diversion, when adhering to best-practices, has been proven to decrease costs to systems 
and improve outcomes for participants.32 By moving up placement and also expanding early options, local 
diversion options can lessen the collateral consequences on individuals who could be more efficiently and 
effectively served in the community and also reduce the use of jail, particularly pretrial detention. As such, 
Oklahoma County should invest in a wider range of pre-booking and prosecutorial diversion mechanisms, 
which vary in duration as well as intensity, based on need and the seriousness of charges. 
Expanding the range of diversion and alternative to incarceration programs in Oklahoma County does 
require the investment of resources, particularly for treatment. But there are effective diversion programs 
targeted to low-level offenses that are not necessarily resource-intensive, such as the ones described in 
Toledo and Philadelphia on the following page. 
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Pre-booking diversion 
A pre-booking diversion program diverts an individual suspected of criminal behavior away from the 
criminal justice system before he or she is charged with a crime or even booked into jail. Some programs 
use a pre-arrest model, where law enforcement diverts individuals to treatment or programming without 
making an arrest. Oklahoma City’s CIT-trained officers and the use of a detox center are two local 
examples. Under a post-arrest model, an eligible individual is arrested but, upon accepting services, 
avoids booking and formal charges. Diversion at this stage requires strong partnerships between law 
enforcement, treatment providers, and other community services. 
OCPD and other local law enforcement agencies should explore other pre-booking models such as the 
Law Enforcement-Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program, which was pioneered in Seattle, WA in 2011. 
Instead of booking an individual suspected of a drug or prostitution crime into jail, police officers can 
offer arrestees the opportunity to be diverted to community-based services overseen by a case-manager. 
While most LEAD participants enter into the program post-arrest, officers are also empowered to refer 
residents in need of services to a case-manager via an informal interaction called a “social contact,” 
preventing an arrest altogether. Using a harm-reduction approach, LEAD services include housing, 
healthcare, job training, addiction treatment, and mental health support. LEAD, unlike other diversion 
programs, is not intended for first-time offenders, but targets high-utilizers with prior criminal justice 
involvement. Initial results have shown that participants had reduced recidivism rates, reduced jail 
bookings, shorter lengths of stay, and were more likely to have stable housing and employment than 
before their enrollment. 33 
Since showing success, LEAD is being replicated in approximately 30 cities across the nation. The 
Santa Fe Police Department (NM) was the second law enforcement agency to adopt the model, tailoring it 
to fit their community’s needs. 34 Their police force had been grappling with high-utilizers, many of whom 
were addicted to opioids (pharmaceuticals and heroin) and were stealing to support their addictions. An 
assessment found that Santa Fe’s top 100 repeat offenders has cost the local criminal justice and health 
systems $4.2 million in three years; collectively, these 100 individuals were arrested 590 times and used 
11,502 bed days. After launching in April 2014, law enforcement in Santa Fe found that LEAD reaches 
many typically underserved individuals: of the first 38 LEAD clients, 66 percent were female, 84 percent 
were Latino, 40 percent were homeless, and 30 percent were parents.  
 
Post-booking and prosecutorial diversion 
Prosecutorial diversion typically applies after someone has been booked into jail. Some post-booking 
diversion programs intervene before formal charges have been filed; these are known as pre-charge 
diversion programs (sometimes referred to as pre-filing programs). In contrast, under a post-charge 
model, prosecutors file charges, but these charges are dropped or reduced upon successful program 
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completion. Residential treatment and other forms of intensive rehabilitation are not always necessary for 
effective prosecutorial diversion. Many use existing departments of probation or pretrial services to 
provide supervision and rely on local organizations to provide programming and other personal 
development opportunities, such as job counseling or case-management.  
 
In Philadelphia, there is The Choice is Yours diversion program. Developed by the district attorney’s 
office, prosecutors can divert first-time, non-violent felony drug offenders into community-based 
programming instead of incarceration.36 Participants, after learning about the program and its 
requirements, enter no-contest pleas prior to enrollment. They are then provided case-management and 
other services to support legal employment, such as job skills training courses. (The aim is to increase 
participants’ likelihood of obtaining legal employment.) After successful completion, graduates’ records 
are expunged, giving the first-time offender a clean record, reducing the collateral consequences of a 
criminal conviction, and sparing the individual and the state a costly prison sentence.  
 
Using prosecutorial diversion as a strategy for reducing racial disparities 
In addition to decreasing unnecessary jail incarceration, prosecutorial diversion is one approach that can reduce 
racial disparities. After conducting a data-driven analysis of Lucas County, OH (Toledo)’s jail population, criminal 
justice stakeholders found racial disparities across almost every point of the justice system; black people made 
up 19 percent of the county population, but 58 percent of the jail population. A deeper dive into the data 
revealed that three charges—drug possession, disorderly conduct, and obstructing official business— were 
disproportionately bringing black people into the jail.35 In response, the county is implementing a pre-charge 
prosecutorial diversion program that targets people with one or more of these three charges. Eligible individuals 
will be diverted at the point of arrest or booking, and successful participants will avoid charges and jail 
incarceration, likely having an impact on racial disparities in the jail.  
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Spotlight on mental health diversion in 
Miami-Dade County 
Over the last decade and a half, Miami-Dade County 
has been able to shift considerable resources from the 
criminal justice system to local mental healthcare. The 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit Criminal Mental Health Project 
(CMHP) of Miami-Dade County, FL was established in 
2000 to divert individuals with serious mental illnesses 
(schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depression) 
and co-occurring disorders away from the criminal 
justice system and into comprehensive community-
based treatment and support services. While this has 
not been a quick or easy process, Miami-Dade’s results 
have been impressive; the jail population has declined 
from 7,800 to 4,800 people and one jail has closed, 
resulting in a savings of $12 million per year.37 To 
achieve these results, Miami-Dade created multiple 
intervention points: 
 
 Pre-arrest diversion. Miami-Dade County utilizes 
CIT officers for diverting people with mental health 
needs pre-arrest. When appropriate, individuals in 
crisis are assisted in accessing treatment facilities in 
lieu of being arrested and taken to jail. In 2012, CIT 
officers from the Miami-Dade Police Department and 
City of Miami Police Department responded to 
10,000 calls, resulting in over 3,500 diversions to 
crisis units and just 45 arrests. As a result of CIT, 
fewer individuals in acute psychiatric crisis are being 
arrested and booked into the jail, more individuals 
are being linked to crisis care in the community, and 
there has also been a dramatic reduction in fatal 
shootings and injuries of people with mental 
illnesses by police officers.  
 
 
 
 Post-booking misdemeanor jail diversion. All 
defendants booked into the jail are screened for 
signs and symptoms of mental illnesses. Individuals 
charged with misdemeanors who meet program 
admission criteria are transferred from the jail to a 
community-based crisis stabilization unit within 24 
to 48 hours of booking. Upon stabilization, legal 
charges may be dismissed or modified in 
accordance with treatment engagement. 
Individuals who agree to services are linked to a 
comprehensive array of community-based 
treatment, support, and housing services and are 
monitored for up to one year. Approximately 300 
defendants participate annually. Recidivism rates 
among program participants have decreased from 
roughly 75 percent to 20 percent annually.  
 Post-booking felony jail diversion. Participants 
in the felony jail diversion program are referred 
through a number of sources including the public 
defender’s office, the state attorney’s office, private 
attorneys, judges, corrections health services, and 
family members. All participants must meet 
diagnostic and legal criteria. Upon entering the 
program, the prosecutor will offer the defendant a 
plea deal that is contingent on his or her successful 
completion of the program, and legal charges may 
be dismissed or modified based on his or her 
engagement with treatment. All program 
participants are assisted in accessing community-
based services and are supervised in the 
community. Individuals participating in the felony 
jail diversion program demonstrate reductions in 
jail bookings and jail days of more than 75 percent, 
with those who successfully complete the program 
demonstrating a low recidivism rate of just 6 
percent. Since 2008, the felony jail program alone 
is estimated to have saved the county over 15,000 
jail days, or more than 35 years.  
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6.  Reduce the impact of justice system fines and fees as a driver of 
jail growth and recidivism    
 
Key findings and challenges 
 
1. Fines, fees, and costs are levied on individuals at practically every point of the criminal justice 
system.  
 Vera’s legal research found over 103 separate statutory fines, fees, or costs assessed on defendants 
and/or those convicted of an offense under Oklahoma State law. An additional 26 fines, fees, or 
costs are imposed at the municipal level. 
 From fingerprinting fees at the jail door ($5), to fees for applying for and being represented by a 
public defender ($15 and approximately $200 respectively), to drug court costs (up to several 
hundreds of dollars a month), and district attorney probation fees ($40 per month), debt can be 
incurred at practically every step of the criminal justice system. People moving through the 
system can easily acquire thousands of dollars of debt. (See Appendix D for a system map of 
possible fines, fees, and costs.) 
 
2. Individuals, including those without the funds to pay, are routinely brought back in to the jail for 
failure to pay criminal justice debt.  
 In 2015, there were 1,052 bookings into the jail for failure to pay or failure to appear only; many 
other people had warrants for failure to pay in addition to other charges. 
 People booked into the jail on failure to appear and/or failure-to-pay warrants spent almost two 
weeks longer (33 days) than the average length of stay for the general jail population (21 days).   
 
3. Individuals are not able to get fines, costs, and fees waived or lowered due to indigence until after 
they have failed to pay and have been brought back to jail.  
Terminology:  
Fines are levied upon an individual as punishment for committing a crime.  
Fees and costs, in contrast, are levied on defendants to recoup revenue for criminal justice agencies such as 
the jail, the courts, and community supervision offices. 
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 Oklahoma law pertaining to the district court’s ability to waive or lower specific fines and fees is 
inconsistent, but Rule 8.5 of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reads, “In the event the 
defendant, because of physical disability or poverty, is unable to pay fine and/or costs either 
immediately or in installment payments, he/she must be relieved of the fine and/or costs; or, in 
the alternative, be required to report back to the court at a time fixed by the court to determine if 
a change of condition has made it possible for the defendant to commence making installment 
payments toward the satisfaction of fine and/or costs.38 Rule 8 hearings could be held 
immediately, but are most often held after people fall behind on their payments.  
 In order to be placed on what is known as the “cost docket” for a Rule 8 hearing, an individual has 
to have already failed to pay. For people who have been arrested and have failure-to-pay holds, a 
judge sees them in jail, will release them if they post cash bond, and then will place them on a cost 
docket for a later date. Once at the hearing, the judge can grant more time to pay or provide 
another solution allowed by law.  
 
4. Excessive fines, fees, and costs disproportionately impact women and people of color.  
 Women, who are statistically poorer than men, were overrepresented in bookings for failure to 
pay; they comprised 37 percent of these arrest charges, but only 27 percent of all 2015 
admissions.39 
 Because fines and fees weigh particularly heavily on those with low incomes, they can exacerbate 
racial and ethnic disparities in the jail population, an area of concern for Oklahoma County.40 
 
5. Criminal justice debt is a barrier to reentry and contributes to recidivism.  
 In addition to causing people to end up back in the jail for failure to pay, significant criminal 
justice debt can lead to long-term economic harm to individuals and their families. Consequences 
include suspended drivers’ licenses (which can lead to more tickets and more jail time); housing 
insecurity; and missed child support payments.41 Community organizations in Oklahoma City 
report that criminal justice debt interferes with the ability of people to maintain employment. 
Multiple court dates and short jail stays due to failure-to-pay warrants can lead to job loss for 
people who are in financially precarious positions and for whom adequate employment is difficult 
to find. 
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Responsive strategies 
 
The district court and other agencies are under pressure to collect fees and costs to support a justice 
system that is not fully funded at the state level. If these costs are driving jail admissions and ongoing 
involvement in the justice system, however, these fundraising efforts may be counterproductive, and 
undermine the economic vitality of communities in Oklahoma County.  
While the fines and fees are set by the legislature, there are strategies that the county can pursue to 
soften their impact. Oklahoma City is currently looking into how they can avoid arrests on warrants based 
solely on failure to pay for municipal offenses. These strategies may also be models for efforts at the 
district court level.  
Legislative recommendation 7b contains guidance for conducting a statewide analysis of fines and 
fees.   
 
Strategy 6a: Conduct earlier indigency determinations, enabling people to manage their debt before 
they fail and ensuring that no one is incarcerated for being poor.  
State law allows some fines and fees to be waived but others cannot be waived or lowered at all; and some 
can only be lowered if all of them are lowered an equivalent amount. Rule 8.5, however, allows for a 
determination of indigency, which can relieve the requirement to pay these costs. 
Under the current system, indigency determinations are typically conducted after someone has 
already been rearrested for failure to pay or failure to appear. Rather than wait for someone to fail, the 
courts should proactively advise defendants that they have the option to pursue an indigency 
determination, the right to a hearing, and the possibility of a payment plan.  
 
Strategy 6b: Develop a district court alternative to arrest and jail booking for cost warrants. 
Jail incarceration is not an appropriate first response to a failure to pay or failure to appear and pay. In 
fact, the county may spend more money enforcing a cost warrant than it is likely to get from someone who 
simply does not have the money to pay. An alternative would be for individuals to receive a summons and 
court date to appear on the cost docket. Oklahoma City is moving to do this for municipal cost warrants by 
adding a new code into their data system so that officers in the field can know when an outstanding 
municipal warrant is only for costs; those individuals will not be brought to the jail. A similar system 
should be adopted for state cost warrants generated from the district court.  
 
Strategy 6c: Make financial obligations easier to pay.  
Not only are court costs themselves onerous, but so are the methods by which they can be satisfied. 
Currently, individuals with costs from district court cannot make payments online and must make credit 
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card payments in person during business hours. In contrast, the municipal court has a variety of payment 
options including online payment and longer evening and weekend hours for people to pay in person.  
Furthermore, it can be difficult for individuals to keep track of various fines, fees, costs, and 
restitution, know how to prioritize these different debts, and decipher where and how to make 
payments.40 People with criminal justice debt should be provided with a consolidated statement that 
itemizes each amount owed, its due date, and the legal basis for this cost.42 The statement should also 
provide directions for how and where to make these payments and what to do if she or he is unable to 
make the payment in full.  
 
 
Legislative agenda 
 
The Task Force has focused its work on strategies to improve the efficiency and fairness of the Oklahoma 
County criminal justice system and to safely reduce the jail population. Many of the changes necessary to 
achieve these goals can be accomplished at the local level through reform of policy and practice in 
Oklahoma County. There are, however, many aspects of the Oklahoma County system that are controlled 
or impacted by state law. This section includes recommendations for legislation that will support the goals 
of the Task Force and other efforts to improve local justice systems.  
Significant change to state criminal law is on the horizon. Two ballot measures, State Question (SQ) 
780, referred to as the Oklahoma Smart Justice Reform Act, and its companion, SQ 781, which establishes 
the County Community Safety Investment Fund, have just passed. These ballot initiatives make low-level 
possession of drugs a misdemeanor rather than a felony and raise the threshold amount that constitutes 
felony theft and other financial crimes to $1,000. They also expand the judicial discretion to use 
community treatment for mental health and substance use issues in lieu of jail time. SQ 781 authorizes the 
creation of a fund from the prison savings realized by the changes in criminal penalties in SQ 780, and 
with monies distributed to counties to finance the expansion of treatment options in the communities.  
While the conversion of felonies to misdemeanors will increase the number of offenses that are 
punishable by county jail time instead of time in state prison, and could therefore increase local jail 
populations, the measures allow greater discretion to use community sentencing instead of incarceration, 
with the prospect of increased funding for treatment resources. Misdemeanors carry lower bail amounts 
in Oklahoma County which could have an immediate impact on pretrial release and expand the use of OR 
and CR bond. At the same time, the pressure of a potential felony conviction is used to encourage 
participation in drug court. Thus, while it is impossible to say definitively how these measures would 
impact the jail in Oklahoma County, they have the potential to enable some reductions to the jail 
population, should that be the priority. 
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Oklahoma is also participating in the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), which is also expected to 
lead to legislation on criminal justice reform this session. While this effort targets drivers of prison 
population growth, many of these issues also effect local jail populations. It will be critical that the JRI 
Task Force consider the impact of proposed reforms on local jail populations and explore reforms that will 
reduce overreliance on jail.   
There are two major areas—in addition to the sentencing reform issues being undertaken through the 
ballot questions and the JRI process—where state legislative reform could support better use of Oklahoma 
County’s jail: pretrial release and costs, fines, and fees. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Enable evidence-based pretrial release decisions 
As discussed above, Oklahoma Statutes, Title 22, Section 1105.3 (“Pretrial Release Act”) authorizes the 
creation of pretrial release programs in the state. The statute allows any county to create a pretrial release 
program, and sets forth minimum requirements for the program, including reporting. The program is 
supposed to screen people who do not bond out to evaluate if they should be released and specify any 
conditions. The statute specifies 40 offenses that make a person ineligible, but separately provides that a 
district judge or associate district judge can order the release of someone who is otherwise ineligible based 
on their offense. Compounded by strict local court rules, these categorical exemptions severely limit 
nonfinancial pretrial release options in Oklahoma County because the judge making pretrial release 
decisions is a special judge, not a district court judge. In addition, the statute authorizes participation in a 
pretrial release program only for those who have failed to bond out of jail. This provision appears to limit 
the creation of a program that uses a pretrial risk assessment, rather than a bail schedule, to decide who 
should enter the jail, which is not best practice nationally. 
Models for state legislative reform to support evidence based pretrial decision-making exist around 
the country. In some cases, legislation is stand-alone, and in others, pretrial reforms are contained within 
larger criminal justice reform bills. Examples of pretrial and bail statutes from other states that could help 
reduce unnecessary pretrial detention in Oklahoma include: 
 Mandating that, in most circumstances, low- and moderate-risk defendants, as assessed by a 
validated evidence-based risk assessment instrument, be released on their own recognizance or on 
unsecured bonds (Alaska Senate Bill 91, 2016). 
 Mandating that judicial officers use results of a validated pretrial risk instrument to inform their 
pretrial release decision making (Delaware Senate Bill 226, 2012). 
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 Encouraging counties to establish pretrial services offices that adhere to evidence-based practices 
(Colorado House Bill 1236, 2013). 
 Establishing an option for preventive detention, in which a defendant deemed too dangerous for 
release into the community is denied pretrial release from the outset (New Jersey Public Question 1, 
2014/Senate Bill 945, 2015). This allows a jurisdiction to move away from cash bail altogether; low-
risk defendants are released on their own recognizance; moderate-risk defendants are released into 
the community but with conditions and/or pretrial supervision, and the highest-risk defendants are 
detained without the fear that they will be able to make bond.  
 Allowing defendants who cannot afford bond to, within seven days of booking, request a bail review 
hearing (CO HB 1236).  
 Establishing a presumption of release to the community on least-restrictive conditions (CO HB 1236). 
 Outlawing the strict and sole use of a bail schedule, without individualized consideration of the 
defendant’s circumstances (CO HB 1236). 
At the very least, Oklahoma should consider reducing or eliminating restrictions on nonfinancial pretrial 
release, allowing local jurisdictions to craft appropriate pretrial release and supervision programs that 
achieve local public-safety goals and follow national evidence-based practices.  
 
Fines, fees, and costs: Address criminal justice debt as a driver of justice system growth 
Fines, fees, and costs are assessed throughout the Oklahoma County justice system; while some are local, 
most of these are mandated at the state level. Vera’s survey of Oklahoma law found at least 103 separate 
statutorily authorized criminal justice legal financial obligations. In addition, individuals mandated to 
programming or drug testing will bear those costs as well. There is evidence from Oklahoma County’s data 
that individuals’ inability to meet these obligations leads to more contact with the justice system, 
including additional arrest warrants for failure to pay and/or failure to appear, as well as jail stays. The 
inability to afford the costs of mandated treatment or other programming may lead to absconding and 
program failure, not to mention failure to address the reasons behind an individual’s criminal behavior. A 
significant portion of the justice system statewide, including the courts and the district attorney’s office, 
are financed through these assessments, making the case for waivers and reductions and payment plans 
harder to make. Generally, individuals with fines, fees, and costs from the district court have to fail first 
before getting access to a hearing on the cost docket, which will get them a payment plan. 
Because fines, fees, and costs are assessed at many points in the system and are dispersed to so many 
different agencies on city, county, and state levels, there is currently no easy source to assess criminal 
costs levied, collected, and outstanding debts owed. Furthermore, the costs of collecting—or attempting to 
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collect—these debts are unknown. The first step in addressing fines and fees should be to commission a 
thorough statewide audit of existing laws, policies, and practices around fines, fees, and costs, including a 
cost-benefit analysis. Legislation could commission this audit as a standalone item or through the 
establishment of a statewide task force charged with commissioning, auditing, and delivering 
recommendations. 
 
A legislative approach to mitigating fines, 
fees, and costs 
One example of a legislative approach to addressing 
the impact of fines, fees, and costs is the Illinois 
Access to Justice Act (HB 3111), passed in 2013. The 
act created a task force to study fines and court fees 
in both the civil and criminal court systems. Comprised 
of representatives from the three branches of 
government and both political parties, the task force 
released its findings and recommendations in June 
2016.43  Key findings include:   
 Fines, fees, and surcharges had increased over time, 
resulting in a “byzantine system” for civil litigants 
and criminal defendants.  
 New fines and fees were constantly added to statute, 
increasing over time and outpacing inflation. 
 The use of fines, fees, and surcharges for both civil 
litigants and criminal defendants varied widely 
between counties, manifesting in vast 
inconsistencies and “threatening the fairness of the 
current system”. 
 
 
 Cumulatively, these costs imposed a “severe and 
disproportionate impact on low- and moderate-
income Illinois residents.” The report continues, 
“Without relief from runaway court costs, more and 
more Illinois residents will be forced to decide 
between protecting their legal rights and paying 
their basic living expenses.” 44 
The task force produced three recommendations 
regarding criminal justice costs to the General 
Assembly:  
 The General Assembly should authorize a uniform 
assessment schedule for criminal and traffic cases 
that is consistent across the state. 
 The General Assembly and the Supreme Court 
should authorize a sliding scale to reduce court costs 
and fees, but not fines, imposed on criminal 
defendants living near the poverty line.  
 The General Assembly should consult a proposed 
“Checklist for Review of New Assessment 
Legislation” before creating new fines, fees, or costs, 
to ensure that the statute is clear and precise.  
 
 
In addition to or as part of an audit or statewide task force on fines, fees, and costs, the state should 
mandate that court systems, district attorney’s offices, and other criminal justice agencies, including 
private agencies, that assess fines, fees, and costs collect data and produce a public report that documents 
what was assessed and collected, the costs of collecting, failure rates and outcomes, policies implemented 
to assess and accommodate indigency, and other outcomes, like warrants issued and incarceration. Other 
legislative recommendations to consider include:45  
  
 
 
62  Vera Institute of Justice 
 
 
 Setting a statewide cap on the percentage of income that can be collected. For instance, some child 
support policy experts have suggested that no more than 20 percent of one’s take-home pay is 
reasonable and achievable.  
 Eliminating the presumption that being able to pay a bond indicates that a person is able to afford 
fines, fees, and costs and a private attorney.  
 Defining terminology used in statute such as “indigent,” “ability to pay,” “undue financial hardship,” 
and so forth, providing clarity to the courts and existing and future statutes.  
 Requiring courts to make findings of a person’s ability to pay on the record.  
 
Understanding the potential impact of these jail 
population reduction strategies 
 
The dearth of good data about who is in the jail and why constrains our ability to accurately project the 
impact of these recommendations on the jail population. However, using the methodology on the 
following page and based on best-practices as applied in our work elsewhere, we can provide a sense of 
the potential impact if the county committed to enacting the recommendations provided in this report. A 
major recommendation for the county is for data collection practices to be improved and policy decisions 
to become routinely data-driven. This will also make impact projections easier and more accurate going 
forward.  
There are several important conclusions to draw from these analyses. First, no one strategy alone will 
significantly reduce the jail population, which has an average daily population of 2,581. The drivers of the 
jail population in Oklahoma County are many and there is no one quick fix. Second, the implementation 
of multiple strategies can reduce the jail population significantly. Many of the levers that will impact the 
population in both the short term and the long term are within the control of stakeholders at the county 
and local level. If the will and the commitment is there, Oklahoma County can have a significantly smaller 
jail. 
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Reducing admissions for municipal charges 
 
In 2015, there were 10,216 admissions to the jail for municipal violations only. People who are admitted to 
jail for municipal violations have an average length of stay of three days. They do not represent a 
significant portion of the people in the jail on any given day (approximately 84 people in the average daily 
population), but they make up a quarter of all the bookings and contribute to the overcrowding and delays 
in the booking area of the jail. In terms of impact, then, it is critical to look at how the policy proposals 
that aim to reduce municipal admissions will influence both daily and yearly admissions and the average 
daily population.    
 
 The number of admissions for municipal violations in 2015 translates into an average of 28 
admissions per day (out of a total of 108 people). A 50 percent reduction in these admissions 
would mean over 5,000 fewer annual bookings into the jail and 14 fewer people 
admitted per day. If Oklahoma County were to achieve a 75 percent reduction in municipal 
admissions, this would mean that 21 fewer people will enter the jail on an average day 
(a 20 percent reduction in overall daily admissions)—which is significant. 
 
 In terms of the impact on the average daily population, a 50 percent reduction in municipal 
admissions would reduce the number of people in the jail by 42 on a given day. A 75 
percent reduction would reduce the daily population by 63 people. The overall impact may 
be greater, however, as the reduction in daily admissions should speed up bookings and releases from 
the jail, reducing length of stay for those who do go in.  
Calculations methodology 
The basic approach to deriving the impact of different strategies on the average daily population of the jail is 
simple. To calculate the number of jail bed days occupied by any target population in a given year, we take 
the number of admissions for that group and multiply it by their average length of stay. To translate that into 
the impact on the average daily population, we divide the total jail bed days by 365. To calculate reductions 
in the average daily population, we multiply the population by the estimated number of days saved per case, 
and divide that number by 365.  The calculations below, which provide a way of considering potential impact, 
do not account for the fact that a number of the strategies target populations that overlap; were all strategies 
to be implemented at the same time, the total impact would be less than the sum of all individual impacts 
together.   
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Creating a fair and efficient pretrial release process 
 
Short term strategies: Expediting OR/CR bond releases and expanding eligibility 
 In 2015, 1,448 people were released on OR and CR bond combined. Currently, the process for 
approval of OR/CR bond release is protracted. It requires a district judge’s approval and 
recommendations of court services may be pending for weeks. If we assume, conservatively, that each 
of those 1,448 individuals stayed 21 days in the jail, which is the average length of stay for all 
admissions, then we can assume that there are approximately 83 people in the jail on a given day who 
could have been released on OR/CR. If release of these individuals was expedited to the probable 
cause hearing, which generally occurs within three days of arrest, this would shorten their length of 
stay by an average of 18 days—reducing the average daily population by 71 people. 
 
 If the number of people released on OR/CR bond could be increased from 1,448 to 3,000 per year, 
with each of those individuals staying three days instead of 21, this would reduce the average 
daily population by 148 people. 
 
Short term strategies: Reducing bail amounts 
 In 2015, there were 11,324 people who were released from the jail after paying bail. Just over one-
third of them, 4,550, got out on the first day. The remaining 6,774 spent an average of 12 days in jail 
before making bail. If bail amounts were set by the highest charge, versus cumulatively, and if public 
defenders were assigned at probable cause hearings to argue for bail reductions, these people might 
get out sooner. If time to release for those individuals was dropped to six days on average, the 
average daily jail population would drop by 111 people.  
 
 Reduced bail amounts, combined with the increased use of personal recognizance bond, could 
significantly increase the number of people released on bond. If, in addition to faster release on bond 
of those who are already getting out, an additional 5,000 people were released on bond within six 
days, instead of staying on average 21 days, the average daily population would drop by 205. 
 
Longer term strategies: Moving to an evidence-based pretrial release system 
An evidence-based pretrial decision-making process will help identify low- and moderate-risk defendants 
who can be safely released to the community while awaiting a decision or a plea in their case. These 
defendants should also be supported by a good court reminder system and appropriate pretrial 
supervision. 
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 The jail data suggests that 80 percent of admissions are pretrial. If those who are admitted on 
municipal offenses only are removed, we can assume that there were approximately 21,263 state 
misdemeanor and felony pretrial admissions. If one-third of those detainees were released at three 
days instead of staying an average of 21, then the average daily population of the jail would 
drop by 349.  If half of pretrial detainees were released at three days, the average daily 
population would drop by 524. 
 
Reducing district court case processing delays 
 
The lack of data around court processes makes impact calculations particularly challenging, but a simple 
exercise suggests how many bed days could be saved by reducing case processing for those in the jail.   
 
 The average length of stay for all admissions is 21 days. Half of all admissions have stays that are three 
days or shorter; these stays will not be shortened by case processing improvements. However, for 
those who stay longer than three days (a total of 19,417 admissions), the average length of stay is 41 
days, a number that better reflects the impact of case processing delays on the jail population. If, for 
those who do not get out in the first three days, the average length of stay could be reduced by 10 days, 
the average daily population would decline by 532 people.   
 
Reducing admissions for warrants 
 
In 2015 the OCPD booked 7,062 people on warrants only. Using the average length of stay (21 days), this 
translates into 406 people in the average daily population admitted for warrants. This analysis estimates 
the population impact of reducing those admissions: 
 A 25 percent reduction in bookings for warrants would reduce the jail population by 
101 people. 
 A 50 percent reduction in bookings for warrants would reduce the jail population by 
203 people. 
 A 75 percent reduction in bookings for warrants would reduce the jail population by 
305 people. 
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Appendix A: key data indicators 
 
This appendix includes recommendations for key indicators for criminal justice agencies and for 
enhancing data collected on race and ethnicity in the criminal justice system. The indicators are organized 
by key pretrial justice decision point. These data will provide stakeholders with a baseline understanding 
of agencies’ functioning, and if analyzed over time will be useful in tracking local system trends, emerging 
issues, and reform progress.  
Many criminal justice fields now use sets of performance measures meant to paint a holistic picture of 
agencies’ functioning. For instance, experts in law enforcement have developed metrics tracking various 
indicators such as public perceptions of safety and response times. While these are important, this 
appendix focuses on indicators that are most relevant to the jail population.  
The following measures should be collected and analyzed so that race/ethnicity and gender can be 
disaggregated.  
 
Arrest and law enforcement contact 
These data should be collected by the county’s municipal police agencies and the sheriff’s office. 
A. Total citations/summons, broken down by:  
Charge (including distinction between city, state misdemeanor, and state felony) 
B. Total arrests, broken down by: 
 Charge(s), (including distinction between city, state misdemeanor, and state felony) 
 Location of arrest—e.g., zip code or block 
 Warrants status and warrant type—e.g. failure-to-pay 
 Arrestee status—e.g., on probation or parole 
C. Total diverted pre-arrest or pre-booking such as drop-offs at detox center and CIT responses. 
Resources: 
Malcolm K. Sparrow, “Measuring Performance in a Modern Police Organization,” New Perspectives in 
Policing (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2015).  
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Ed. Robert H. Langworthy, Measuring What Matters: Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute 
Meetings, (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 1999). 
 
 
Pretrial release measures 
A. System wide indicators for pretrial release (district court and jail) 
 Pretrial detainee length of stay: the length of stay in jail for pretrial detainees  
 Pretrial detention rate: the percentage of defendants who are incarcerated throughout the pre-
trial period  
 Jail pretrial detention: the percentage of the jail population that isn’t convicted (as distinguished 
from those awaiting hearing on post-sentencing matters) 
 Average bail amount set by top-charge severity 
 Percentage of defendants who make bail, broken down by total bail amount 
 Appearance rates for all defendants, broken down by release type 
 
B. Indicators from court services  
 Screening rate: the percentage of defendants potentially eligible for release by statute or local 
court rule that are screened in a timely manner 
 
 Concurrence rate: the percentage of cases in which the court/judges adhere to court services’ 
pretrial release recommendations 
 
 Appearance rate: the percentage of supervised defendants who make all scheduled court 
appearances, broken down by charge severity and/or supervision level 
 Safety rate: the percentage of supervised defendants who are not charged with a new offense 
during the pretrial stage, broken down by charge severity and/or supervision level 
 
 Success rate: the percentage of supervised defendants who 1) are not revoked for technical 
violations of the conditions of their release, 2) appear for all scheduled court appearances, and 3) 
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are not charged with a new offense during pretrial supervision, broken down by charge severity 
and/or supervision level 
 
Resource: 
National Institute of Corrections, Measuring What Matters: Outcome and Performance Measures for 
the Pretrial Services Field, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 
Corrections, 2011). 
  
Charging/district attorney’s office 
A. Number of cases accepted/declined for prosecution, broken down by: 
 Arresting agency/municipality 
 Top charge severity 
 Charge description/code 
 
B. Number of prosecutorial diversions, broken down by: 
 Charge(s)  
 Success or failure 
 Time from arrest to program enrollment 
 Average time to program completion 
 
C. Case outcomes, broken down by  
 Convictions, dismissals, placement in diversion or specialty courts 
 Time from initial appearance to disposition 
 
D. Number on DA probation 
 Demographics 
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 Length of time on supervision 
 Success and failure rates 
 
Resource: 
The American Prosecutors Research Institute, Prosecution in the 21st Century: Goals, Objectives, and 
Performance Measures, (Alexandria, VA: American Prosecutors Research Institute, 2004).  
 
Assignment of counsel  
The following measures should be collected by the public defender’s office. 
A. Number of cases handled by the office broken down by: 
 Charge type 
 Average lawyer caseload size 
 
B. Number of defendants who enter diversion programs, broken down by: 
 Charge(s) and major crime categories 
 Major crime categories 
 Success or failure 
 Average time to program completion 
 
C. Case outcomes: Convictions, dismissal, placement in diversion or specialty courts 
 
D. Times to disposition 
 
System-wide measures: 
A. Number of defendants represented by: 
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 Private counsel 
 Public defender 
 Court-assigned counsel 
 
Resources:  
Marea Beeman, Basic Data Every Defender Program Needs to Track, (Washington, DC: National Legal 
Aid & Defender Association, 2014).  
Ziyad Hopkins, The Committee for Public Counsel Services Answering Gideon’s Call Project: Best 
Practices, Objectives and Performance Indicators, (New York: Center for Court Innovation, November 
2014). 
  
Measures for the jail population 
A. Average daily population 
B. Total admissions, broken down by: 
 Arresting agency 
 Charge and severity (city, state misdemeanor, or state felony)  
 Warrant status 
C. Total releases, broken down by: 
 Release reason (including amount of bail paid if applicable) 
 Length of stay 
D. Daily population, broken down by: 
 Length of stay 
 Legal status (pretrial—including bail amount; convicted: sentenced to DOC; convicted: locally 
sentenced to jail; post-conviction:failure to appear, failure to pay, application to 
revoke/accelerate) 
 Charge(s) and severity (city, state misdemeanor, or state felony)  
 Mental health diagnosis—yes or no 
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Measures for case processing and courts 
A. Total number of cases, broken down by: 
 Dismissals/acquittals 
 Convictions 
 Other 
 Total number of trials 
 
B. Total number of convicted cases, broken down by: 
 Prison 
 Time served 
 Jail (including split sentences) 
 Deferred sentence 
 Suspended sentence 
 
C. Case processing times—average duration of time between stages: 
 Arrest and arraignment 
 Arraignment and disposition  
 Disposition and sentencing 
Sentencing and release (including sentencing and release to DOC 
Resources: 
Richard Van Duizend, David C. Steelman, and Lee Suskin, Model Time Standards for State Trial Courts 
(Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts, August 20ll). 
CourTools, Giving the Courts the Tools to Measure Success (Williamsburg, VA: National Center’s Court 
Services Division, 2005) 
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Measures for specialty courts: 
 Number of participants broken down by demographics and charge(s) 
 Time from arrest to entry 
 Time from entry to completion 
 Completion/graduation rates 
 Number of absconders 
 Failures and reason for failure 
 Post-program recidivism rates 
 
Resources: 
Rachel Porter, Michael Rempel, and Adam Mansky, What Makes a Court Problem-Solving?: Universal 
Indicators for Problem-Solving Justice (New York: Center for Court Innovation, February 2010). 
National Center on State Courts, Performance Measures of Drug Courts: The State of the Art, 
(Williamsburg, VA: NCSC, 2008).  
National Center for State Courts, Mental Health Court Performance Measures Introduction & Overview 
(Williamsburg, VA: NCSC, 2010). 
Strategies for enhancing race and ethnicity data collection 
As described in recommendation Strategy 1e, it is important to collect accurate race, ethnicity, and gender 
data at each key decision point to develop an understanding of disparities and for monitoring the impact 
of new reforms and initiatives. The following are recommendations for enhancing accurate data 
collection: 
A. Develop policies that promote racial self-identification whenever possible. System professionals, such 
as law enforcement officers, should be trained to ask individuals to self-identify at point of contact.  
 
B. Record race and ethnicity. Hispanic and/or Latino is considered an ethnicity and is not the same as 
race. To obtain the most accurate information, best practices, in accordance with federal guidelines, 
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include asking a series of three questions, with the first two limited to fixed categories.1 They are as 
follows: 
1. Are you Hispanic or Latino/a? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Unsure 
2. What is your race? 
 American Indian or Alaskan Native 
 Asian 
 Black or African American 
 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
 White 
 Multi-racial 
The third question is open-ended but may be useful, particularly for understanding local disparities 
amongst Native American populations.  
3. Do you identify primarily with a country of origin, or, if you are Native American, a particular 
tribe? 
C.  Create consistent protocols for collecting and entering race and ethnicity data across agencies. 
Agencies should use the same racial and ethnic categories so outcomes and disparities can be 
analyzed across (and between) decision points.2 
 
                                                             
 
 
1  Guidelines for Collecting and Recording the Race and Ethnicity of Youth in Illinois’ Juvenile Justice System, 
Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission, October 2008.  
 
2 This recommendation and subsequent recommendations are adapted from The W. Haywood Burns Institute’s 
San Francisco Justice Reinvestment Initiative: Racial and Ethnic Disparities Analysis for the Re-Entry Council, 
(Oakland, CA: Burns Institute, January 2016). 
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D.  Codify protocol around race/ethnicity data collection in staff training manuals. Employees should 
have periodic refresher trainings.  
E.  Train data entry staff in protocols and monitor quality assurance. This data is only pertinent if it is 
entered (and analyzed) correctly.  
F.  Develop capacity to report on key data metrics for each criminal justice agency by race, ethnicity, and 
gender.  
 
Appendix B: additional information and resources for 
establishing a criminal justice coordinating committee 
 
Initial steps for developing a regional criminal justice coordinating committee. 
1. Authorize and define purpose of committee. As a first step, a new CJCC should be legally established 
by a joint resolution of local government, a joint powers agreement, a municipal ordinance, a 
resolution of the county government, or an executive order from a mayor or county commissioners.  
2. Determine geographic scope. Most CJCCs are countywide, which means that they include 
representatives from both county government and the cities contained within the county. In less 
populated areas, small cities and counties have combined resources to form a regional committee.  
3. Establish internal structure. A CJCC should be led by a chairperson and may benefit from a vice-
chair. Many CJCCs have subcommittees or work groups; these can represent a major arm of the 
criminal justice system (e.g. the Courts) or be used to delve deeper into cross-agency issues (e.g. 
establishing a pre-arrest diversion problem or tackling open air drug markets).  
4. Develop bylaws. Bylaws outline operations (such as meeting schedule), delineate responsibilities and 
powers, describe rules around membership, and so forth.  
5. Determine representation and membership. A CJCC should include both elected and general 
government officials, leadership from the integral justice agencies, and include city and county 
employees. Many councils also include members from other relevant agencies such as mental health 
or juvenile justice and community members.  
6. Select a chair. The chairperson should be a strong leader, understand the regional justice system, and 
be able to generate consensus. 
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Resource: 
Robert C. Cushman, Guidelines for Developing a Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee, 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, 2002).   
 
Staffing a CJCC. A well-run CJCC is supported by a full-time administrator, sometimes called the 
“planner.” Responsibilities often include: 
 developing data capacity and encouraging agencies to use and share their data; 
 collecting and analyzing data in response to committee’s needs and interests; 
 monitoring pertinent local, state, and federal legislation; 
 sustaining momentum and monitoring progress of reforms; 
 developing shared regional vision and mission with members; 
 planning for resource allocation and reviewing budgets; 
 designing, implementing, and evaluating pilot projects and new initiatives; and 
 providing and/or locating technical assistance and training opportunities. 
 
In Guidelines for Staffing a Local Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee, Michael R. Jones suggests 
that the CJCC planner or administrator should be housed within the county manager’s office.3 The office 
is seen as more neutral than say, for example, the DA’s office, and the planner will have access to county 
databases and budget information. Most CJCCs fund their administrators from the county general fund. 
In other circumstances, several local agencies have pooled funds to cover his or her salary.  
 
Resource: 
Michael R. Jones, Guidelines for Staffing a Local Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee, National 
Institute of Corrections, 2012. 
 
Principles of effective CJCCs. To create lasting change, Justice Management Institute, which 
convenes the National Network of Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils (NNCJCC), advises that CJCCs 
should avoid “quick-fixes” or tackling low-hanging fruit, which may be symptoms of larger scale issues. 
Qualities of CJCCs that enable sustainable, systemic change include:4 
                                                             
 
 
3  Michael R. Jones, Guidelines for Staffing a Local Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee (Washington, DC: 
National Institute of Corrections, 2012). 
4 M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove and Marea Beeman. Fostering and Sustaining Criminal Justice Reform: The 
Potential of Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils, Arlington, VA: The Justice Management Institute. 
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 Decentralized power. Although a CJCC may have an elected or appointed chairperson, decision-
making power is shared.  
 Low formalization. The structure of CJCCs is often codified in local or state statute. However, CJCCs 
are generally adaptable in their focus and mission in order to respond to the jurisdictions’ most 
pressing issues.   
 Even distribution of rewards. Due to the collaborative nature of and shared power of CJCCs, these 
bodies often ensure that multiple agencies and the criminal justice system at large benefit from 
reforms. Thus, rewards are shared.  
 Highly trained membership. CJCC members have a deep knowledge of their agencies and operations, 
integral to quality planning implementation.  
 Emphasis on quality over quantity. Successful CJCCs have a comprehensive scope and take a 
systemic approach to reforms, with an eye towards sustainability.  
 
For a general overview of the importance of a CJCC in local criminal justice reform, see: 
 
Resources: 
Aimee Wickman Barry Mahoney, and M. Elaine Borakove, Improving Criminal Justice System Planning 
and Operations: Challenges for Local Governments and Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils, 
(Arlington, VA: The Justice Management Institute, 2012.)   
 
 M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove and Marea Beeman, Fostering and Sustaining Criminal Justice Reform: 
The Potential of Criminal Justice Coordinating Councils, (Arlington, VA: The Justice Management 
Institute, 2013).  
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Appendix C: Oklahoma county criminal justice system 
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Appendix D: Oklahoma county criminal justice fines and 
fees system map 
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